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Introduction  
 
One of the principal characteristics of European overseas expansion was the foundation of 
commercial trading companies, charged with the advancement of their commercial interests in both 
the East and the West. This institutional arrangement was new to the existing local trading networks. 
Whereas the Portuguese, pioneers in the Eastern trade, had expressly organized their Estado da 
India as being part of the state, the English and Dutch East India Companies in contrast were granted 
extensive public powers by their respective governments.
1
 These powers included the right to 
conclude alliances with foreign Princes and Peoples, the right to maintain armies and the right to 
administer justice. Competencies that are nowadays considered to be the sole prerogative of the 
sovereign state. The West Indische Compagnie (WIC) and the Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie 
(VOC) laid the foundations for the later Dutch colonial empire. The companies are sometimes 
regarded as the first limited liability companies in history. Considering that the companies carried 
this public authority, while being private entities, the question is raised how we should evaluate their 
legal status.
2
 
 Today, the WIC is mostly known for its role in the Atlantic slave trade. However, this was not 
what the Company was created for. Its original purposes should be understood in the context of the 
Eighty Years war. At the time of its founding, the Twelve Year Truce had just expired and the 
hostilities with Spain were resumed. One of the main purposes of the WIC was to damage the 
Spanish commercial empire in the Atlantic through warfare and trade. Because of this public interest, 
the Company had been granted a trading monopoly. Another important purpose was the 
establishment of colonies in the Americas, as had been advocated by the spiritual father of the 
Company, Willem Usselincx. In order to achieve these purposes, to maintain its monopoly and to 
govern the anticipated colonies, the WIC would have to be able to yield state like, or sovereign, 
powers: to issue laws, administer justice and maintain foreign relations. The main question 
addressed in this thesis revolves about the concept of sovereignty in a world where these kind of 
corporations were active.
3
 
 The legal dimensions of the Dutch expansion overseas were the subject of study by the 
Netherlands' most famous legal scholar, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). Grotius' most widely read works, 
Mare Liberum and De Iure Belli ac Pacis, earned him great fame already during his own lifetime. He 
retained this status through the ages and today he is widely considered to be one of the founding 
                                                           
1
 James D. Tracy, 'Introduction' in: James D. Tracy ed., The Political Economy of Merchant Empires. State Power 
and World Trade 1350-1750 (Cambridge 1991) 1-21, 2-3. 
2
 Henk den Heijer, De geoctrooieerde compagnie. De VOC en de WIC als voorlopers van de naamloze 
vennootschap (Deventer 2005) 1-8. 
3
 Henk den Heijer, De geschiedenis van de WIC (Second edition; Zutphen 2002) 21-30.  
3 
 
fathers of our modern system of international law. Recently however, historians and political 
scientists have argued that his theories also provided the legal justification for European overseas 
expansion.
4
 
 J.A. Somers has undertaken a comprehensive study on the legal status of the VOC in 
international law. Should we consider the VOC to be a sovereign entity, not subject to any higher 
authority in the East Indies? He concludes that the view of the Company as a de iure sovereign entity 
has to be rejected.
5
 This affirms the conclusion drawn by arbitrator Max Huber in a 1928 case 
between the Netherlands and the United States. The case concerned the claim of sovereignty over 
the small island of Palmas, situated between Indonesia and the Philippines. The U.S. claimed to be 
the rightful successor to Spain, which had ceded the island in a 1898 treaty. The Netherlands had 
based their claim on colonisation by the VOC, which they argued, had exercised sovereignty since at 
least 1677. Agreements concluded with the rulers of the Island of Sangi by the VOC established Dutch 
suzerainty over Palmas.
6
 Arbitrator Max Huber stated in the judgement : “The acts of the East India 
Company in view of occupying or colonizing the regions at issue in the present affairs must in 
international law, be entirely assimilated to acts  of the Netherlands state itself”.
7
 This classification 
should also be considered to apply to the WIC.
8
 Recent research on the legal aspects of early modern 
European expansion show however that the reality was more complex. To what extent was the WIC 
able to operate as a de facto state overseas? In order to delineate the extent of the sovereignty 
exercised by the First Dutch West India Company in the course of the seventeenth century, I will 
conduct three case studies, the events of which take place in the two most important areas of 
Company activity: in Brazil and on the coast of West Africa. The selected cases shed some light on 
how the issue of the Company's constitutional position became relevant and how this was discussed 
in the various conflicts that arose in the history of the First WIC; a position that is hard to define in 
the oligarchic 'federal' Republic, that lacked a constitution or any other governing legal statute.  
 The cases are put into the context of the problems that the Company was facing at that time. 
Crushing debt and fierce international competition made that the WIC was less successful in its 
Atlantic endeavours than the VOC would be in Asia. A second focus point of this thesis is to show that 
the legal status of the WIC was not just an academic issue, but that it was also a matter of practical 
importance within the Republic, turning up in court cases in which the WIC was a party. Lastly, in a 
broader context the abovementioned themes tie into the concept of sovereignty in early modern 
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Europe. The notion of imperial sovereignty, one of the defining characteristics of which was its 
divisibility, does not accord with our idea of state sovereignty as it was developed in nineteenth 
century Europe, termed the Westphalian model of sovereignty. Crucial in the imperial system of 
Europe were a decentralized organization and the delegation of sovereign powers to sub-state 
entities. 
 In Chapter I, a historiographical overview on the issues of chartered companies and 
sovereignty will be given. The views of two contemporary scholars, Hugo Grotius and Pieter de la 
Court, will also be discussed. They held opposing views on the utility and legality of the Dutch 
chartered companies. Chapter II will then shortly discuss the founding history of the WIC and the 
laws that laid out the extent of its public powers. The last three chapters will be devoted to the case 
studies. The first case is about the seizure of a Dutch merchant ship in Recife by Company 
authorities. When the captain and owners of the ship question the integrity of the judicial 
proceedings that follow the seizure, the case is brought under the attention of the States-General. 
The resulting discussion gives insight in the extent of the judicial jurisdiction of the Company.  
The second case deals with an episode in WIC history during the 1660s, when the Company was 
faced with increasing competition from other European states. Two competing Scandinavian 
companies turned out to be Amsterdam operations, conducted under a foreign flag. The trial of Isaac 
Coymans, one of the financiers of the Danish Africa Company, is about the nature of treason and the 
question whether this offence can be committed against a private trading company. In the last case, 
in the same context of 'Danish' competition, the diplomatic consequences of a crackdown by the WIC 
against the Danish company will be discussed. To what extent can the state be held responsible for 
any offences perpetrated by the WIC against foreign companies? What happens when company 
interests do not align with state interests and foreign policy? Discussion of these cases is based on 
legal opinions by Dutch jurists. Shared characteristics in all these cases are first, the central position 
of arguments derived from the works of Grotius. Secondly, as will be shown, the opaque 
constitutional structure in the Republic provides different interest groups and their advocates with a 
lot of space to develop various legal arguments as justification for their operations. Still, these legal 
scholars share similar concerns about the legal status of the WIC and its relationship with the States-
General. 
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I Historiography 
 
Before turning to the central subject of this thesis, the Dutch West India Company, this chapter will  
start with a broad look at a selection of recent literature on the early modern perception of 
sovereignty. It touches upon the history of the sovereign state as we know it today and the supposed 
development of an international community of equal and independent states. Subsequently we will 
turn specifically to the chartered company as a bearer of sovereign power. To put the issue in a 
comparative perspective, the relation of the English East India Company (EIC) with the English crown 
will be addressed. The chapter will be concluded by looking at the views of Pieter de la Court and 
Hugo Grotius on the functions and competences of the Dutch trading companies. 
 Contemporary international law is for the most part characterized by the interactions 
between sovereign states belonging to an international community. The fundamental legal principle 
underlying this community is sovereign equality. This principle is codified in what some have called 
the 'constitution' of this international system, the United Nations Charter. Moreover, article 2(4) of 
the Charter prohibits the 'threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.'
9
 Conventionally, the origins of this system are dated back to the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648, the conclusion of the Thirty Years War, when the principle of non-intervention was instituted 
and sovereignty was understood as having the supreme authority within a territory.
10
 Now, under 
the influence of globalization and the proliferation of inter- and supranational organization, some 
academics have signalled the dawn of a post-Westphalian order: 'In this post-Westphalian order, 
there is marked shift towards heterarchy—a divided authority system—in which states seek to share 
the tasks of governance with a complex array of institutions, public and private, local, regional, 
transnational and global, representing the emergence of ‘overlapping communities of fate’.'
11
 There 
is a growing realization that the nation state 'may not be the final stage in some historical 
development. It may just turn out to be only one political agency among many.' This has led certain 
scholars to engage in a reevaluation of the concept of sovereignty as an indivisible bundle of rights.
12
 
 The historical development sketched here depicts the orthodox view in the history of 
international relations. In the past ten years, scholars of international relations have started to 
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oppose the idea that the Westphalian system, with the nation-state at its core, is only just now 
starting to change, under the influence of supranational organizations and globalization. 
 In his book Beyond Anarchical Society Edward Keene presents a challenge to the idea of the 
'Westphalian order' and its centrality of the society of states by pointing out the existence of divisible 
sovereignty in early modern Europe. How can we live in a post-Westphalian order if the old one was 
not Westphalian? The abovementioned scholars of international relations have stressed  that the 
idea of divided sovereignty is a very modern, or Post-Westphalian, development. Thereby neglecting 
the fact that there were many entities in early modern times that carried a selection of sovereign 
powers. One of these entities was, it is argued in this thesis, the Dutch West India Company.
13
 
Keene's arguments build upon the works of Hugo Grotius, arguing that the Dutch scholar himself 
recognized the existence of divisible sovereignty. He posits that Grotius' views have been 
misconstrued by nineteenth century thinkers who tried to use them as a defence of the old European 
monarchies against the advancing armies of Napoleon.
14
 Historical alternatives to the state-system 
have not gotten enough attention in analyses of international order.  Moreover, he argues that the 
European states imposed their system outside of Europe in order to delegitimize any alternative 
form of political organization.
15
  
 Late medieval Europe was characterized by a diverse set of different entities that exercised 
territorial sovereignty and competed with each other. Hendrik Spruyt argues that the process of 
change  from feudalism  to the sovereign state cannot be described as inevitable and unilinear. The 
waning feudal society resulted in city-states, city leagues and monarchies existing alongside each 
other.
16
 Spruyt analyzes the emergence of the territorial sovereign state as a form of survival of the 
fittest. The biological process of evolution is similar to the way in which the sovereign state as an 
institutional arrangement prevailed over alternative options, like city states or leagues: 
'The sovereign, territorial state emerged because it happened to be better than its alternatives, not 
because it was the result of some necessary unilinear process. [...]'. Divided sovereignty , he argues, 
lead to unpredictable and therefore inefficient conduct of international relations. In Spruyt's analysis, 
the most inefficient modes of organization would over time, necessarily, become extinct. 
17
 What 
does this mean for the future of the sovereign state? What are the forces that determine the most 
efficient ordering of a polity? 
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'Economic and environmental forces in and of themselves thus do not indicate the nature of future 
institutional evolution. Indeed, I argue that there are serious impediments to changing the de iure 
nature of the state system. But such forces do provide incentives and sets of ideas for actors who are 
unwilling to make do with the present.'
18
 
 
This observation seems to be prescient in light of the current debate in Europe over the future of the 
European Union. We can see now that, pressured by an economic crisis, European statesmen are 
forced to consider the transfer of more and more elements of its state sovereignty to Brussels. 
 These developments notwithstanding, it must be emphasized that the concept of 
territoriality still resides at the heart of international law. There can be no state, no sovereignty and 
no jurisdiction, without territory. Even if there are developments that signal a decline in this 
centrality as a consequence of globalization, like concerns over human rights and the environment,  
which transcend national boundaries.
19
 Charles Tilly gives a sociological definition of the state in 
Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 which also contains this condition of 
territoriality: 'Let us define states as coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from 
households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other 
organizations within substantial territories. The term therefore includes city-states, empires, 
theocracies, and many other forms of government, but excludes tribes, lineages, firms, and churches 
as such.'
20
 In line with abovementioned authors, Tilly notes that the state seems to be in the final 
stage of its development and will remain the dominant system of political organization, while at the 
same time rival forms have materialized, like international organizations and transnational 
corporations.
21
  
 However, accounts of the development of the territorial nation-state are flawed, as Lauren 
Benton shows in her book A Search for Sovereignty. Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-
1900. The necessary connection between sovereignty and territoriality that we make today does not 
give a correct depiction of sovereignty in the early modern world.
22
 European expansion in the early 
modern period was highly dependent on portable subjecthood, not only by state officials, but also by 
a variety of non-official explorers, like merchants, missionaries or settlers who carried legal authority. 
Because of the limited capacity of the early modern state, the extension of imperial sovereignty to 
overseas territories necessarily relied, on the one hand, on the delegation of legal powers to these 
                                                           
18
 Ibidem, 193. 
19
 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Sixth Edition; Cambridge 2010) 487-488. 
20
 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 (Revised paperback edition, Malden 1992) 
1-2. 
21
 Ibidem, 3-4. 
22
 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty. Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 (New York 2010) 280. 
8 
 
non-state entities or persons. On the other hand, those travellers were often very eager to claim to 
be an agent or subject of a certain sovereign in their dealings with foreign rulers.
23
  
The resulting 'system' can be defined as one of layered and divided sovereignty, in which there were 
many areas of overlap. Trading companies functioned in this imperial world as agents to which 
sovereignty was delegated. Their role was not focused on territorial control, rather at exercising 
authority over subjects. The asymmetrically organized empires also provided a fertile environment 
for the development of new legal theories, to be used as justification for imperial expansion.  
Benton challenges the history of the territorial nation-state as told by, amongst others, Tilly. Aside 
from the tendency for territorial rule, she draws attention to this parallel process in which layered 
and divided sovereignty were employed by European states to govern their empires.
24
 Moreover, she 
shows that the spread of legal culture is tied up with geographical features.
25
 By dislodging the view 
of empires as contiguous stretches of land centrally governed by a European power and replacing it 
with one of asymmetrical  patches and 'corridors' of jurisdiction and sovereignty, Benton makes us 
more aware of the complex nature of these concepts in the early modern period.
26
  
 The seventeenth century Dutch trading companies were unique institutions. Aside from the 
innovative way in which capital was raised for the overseas trade, one of their defining traits was 
that they were of a mixed private/public character. This innovation was mainly the result of 
pragmatic considerations and a flexible interaction between governmental and commercial concerns.  
A necessity for the weak pre-modern state, in particular in the federally organized Republic where a 
lack of centralized power created a fragmented power structure, was to share sovereign power with  
other organized bodies including guilds, corporations and, within the context of overseas expansion, 
trading companies.
27
 Charles Tilly's explanatory model for European state formation centres on the 
dynamics between states wielding coercive powers and cities as centres of capital accumulation. 
Characteristic for the development of the Dutch Republic would then be the predominance of a 
capitalist elite providing the financial basis for expanding state operations, while at the same time 
resisting the formation of a centralized state wielding coercive powers.
28
 His fiscal-military model 
entails that capital intensive, coercion intensive, and those states that followed a path in-between, 
eventually all developed  into territorial nation-states as a result of warfare. Military innovation 
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increasingly required states to raise capital and maintain standing armies, which was only possible 
through the creation of a state bureaucracy levying taxes.
29
 
 While subscribing to Tilly's fiscal-military theory, Julia Adams argues that this model of 
explanation has to be amended. She argues that patrimonialism  was essential for both the rise and 
decline of the Dutch Republic and an essential element in the history of Dutch state building: 
 
'Patrimonial rulers typically rule, and consolidate and extend their reach, by granting politico-
economic privileges  to followers or agents of some sort. In Europe, where corporate groups had 
long-established legitimacy, those agents were likely to be corporate groups or estates, which were 
then liable for certain reciprocal obligations to the ruler. This hoary practice enabled rulers in early 
modern Europe to gather funds and deploy power while corporate elites, in turn, got economic 
concessions, political representation, derived symbolic status, and, crucially, family advancement.'
30
 
 
As mentioned, the Netherlands had inherited a state with a weak political infrastructure. Remnants 
of feudal times necessitated that sovereignty was shared not only between state institutions but also 
guilds and corporations. In that context it might be less surprising that the newly created joint stock 
companies were endowed with extensive public powers. These institutions were subsequently 
controlled by elite regent families in a patriarchal fashion. The families were continuously trying to 
expand their respective power through clientelism and venal office-holding.
31
 In both government 
and in the chartered companies, embedded familial interests could be determinative of the course 
that would be taken and often these interests would clash with each other. Yet, Adams argues, it was 
also this familial governance that set the Republic apart in the seventeenth century, because 
coordination between families provided a certain stability that eventually lead to the Dutch Golden 
Age.
32
 
 As will be shown in this thesis, the flexibility that resulted from the patrimonial organization 
did not function flawlessly and could lead to legal uncertainty and conflict. Moreover, these 
characteristics turned out to be more suitable in the Asian trading world, than in the Atlantic. Asia 
had known a sophisticated and well functioning trading system for centuries in which the newly 
arriving Europeans had to find creative ways of participating. In the Atlantic, however, the European 
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powers were faced with familiar competition from each other.
33
 In Asia, trading companies were able 
to "plug into" an existing Asian system of suzerainties and hierarchy between local rulers. Not 
necessarily starting on top of the pyramid, the companies were eventually able to replace some of 
those local rulers with their own colonial administrations.
34
 Because of this difference between trade 
in the East and in the West, most literature on the legal aspects of Dutch trading companies concern 
the VOC (Aside from the fact that the history of the WIC has not nearly been as thoroughly 
researched as that of the VOC). 
  
Company sovereignty 
In a classic study on the subject, Introduction to the history of the law of nations in the East Indies, 
C.R. Alexandrowicz describes how relations between European and non-European attributed to the 
development of the law of nations during a period of expanding world trade. In the early years of 
European expansion the Portuguese encountered problems with regards to their legal title on 
overseas territories. They had based their titles on the Papal donation in the bull Inter Caetera 
(1492), which had divided the world outside Europe into a Spanish and a Portuguese sphere of 
influence. However, with regards to Asian rulers and European competition, this position became 
untenable. It overlooked the legal status of the local rulers, who were often entangled in hierarchical 
suzerain relationships with neighboring powers. How were these rulers to be classified for the 
purpose of maintaining diplomatic relations?
35
 Conversely, Asian rulers were unsure how to 
approach European trading companies. In the early seventeenth century they sent envoys to deal 
directly with European governments. Later, they were dealing directly with the companies, as 
replacing some of their fellow Asian suzerains.
36
 
 Alexandrowicz classifies the powers given to the trading companies in their charters as quasi-
sovereign powers and he connects this to current examples of non-State entities carrying 
sovereignty.
37
 What is the status of the treaties concluded in the first half of the seventeenth century 
under the law of nations? The author regards these treaties to be agreements concluded between 
equal parties and valid under international law: 'Thus in the East Indies, a confrontation between two 
worlds took place on a footing of equality and the ensuing commercial and political transactions, far 
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from being in a legal vacuum, were governed by the law of nations as adjusted to local interstate 
custom.'
38
 
 It is the validity and relevancy of this last statement that is expressly questioned by J.A. 
Somers. In his dissertation, Somers makes an elaborate analysis of the formal legal position of the 
Dutch East India Company. His purpose is to clearly demarcate the discrepancy between the de facto 
position of the Company on the one hand, and its formal legal status under the law of nations. It can 
be seriously doubted whether Asian princes concluding treaties with VOC representatives were 
aware of the full meaning of the often ambiguously worded  documents, the provisions of which 
were drafted in Western legal language.
39
 No fully grown system of international law existed in the 
East Indies yet, and Asian potentates considered the agreements more like unilateral grants of 
privilege and not contracts that created reciprocal rights and obligations.
40
 
 Similar to the commercial activities conducted by the EIC in India, trading by the VOC on the 
basis of its charter would incrementally lead to the establishment of an administrative body intended 
to govern a commercial empire. Nevertheless, Somers draws the conclusion that, de iure, the VOC 
cannot be classified as a sovereign subject of international law. A close reading of the treaties 
concluded with Asian rulers and the wording of the articles of the VOC Charter, opposes such a 
classification. However, de facto, the Company functioned as a sovereign; a view shared by the Asian 
rulers over which the Company exercised suzerain authority. The conclusion drawn by Somers and 
Max Huber, arbitrator in the Island of Palmas case is that the VOC was acting as an agent of the state 
when exercising their public powers (e.g. when concluding treaties). 
 However, with this conclusion the issue cannot be dismissed. How should we evaluate the de 
facto situation when looked at through the prism of divisible sovereignty? The Company-State 
written by Philip J. Stern addresses the issue of corporate sovereignty. It looks at the seventeenth 
century history of the English East India Company and its mixed private/public character. Just as the 
Dutch West and East India Companies, the EIC was governed by a charter, granted in 1600 by the 
Crown, in which its powers were laid down.
41
 The latter Company was in many respects more 
independent from the Crown than the WIC was from the States-General.
42
 Still, the constitutive 
Charter was equipped with powers similar to those of the WIC and VOC, aimed at providing the 
necessary security for a prosperous overseas trade. It was not anticipated that these companies 
would lay the foundations for an eventual colonial empire in the course of the eighteenth and 
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nineteenth centuries.
43
 Stern argues that the delegation of powers by the English Crown to the EIC in 
fact often amounted to a limitation of royal power as the Company assumed full control over English 
subjects within its overseas realm: 'From the Charter flowed an intertwined jurisdiction over trade, 
people, places, and passageways within a vast and often fungible hemispheric jurisdiction.' 
Specifically, the EIC succeeded in gradually increasing its authority in its battle against English 
interlopers. Starting in the 1680s, it employed a legal division charged with bringing civil claims 
against violators of the Charter in London. A notable case in this regard is that of East India Company 
v. Thomas Sandys (1682) (Also known as the Great Case of the Monopolies). The Sandys case gave 
rise to a debate in England on the purposes of the East India Company, the necessity of a trading 
monopoly and the character of its public or private authority.
44
 The advocates of the EIC grounded 
their arguments on the premise that the Company had a special character and encompassed more 
than a mere private corporation granted with a trading monopoly. One of the argumentations 
behind the necessity of a monopoly was that it was important to maintain stable relationships with 
local Asian rulers and that one common policy was to be preferred over a multitude of conflicting 
messages.
45
 The Chief Justice, in agreeing with this position, stated: 
 
'Would it not be monstrous, that when the King is entered into League with any Sovereign Prince in a 
matter of trade, very advantageous to his People, to have it in the power of any one of his subjects to 
destroy it?'
46
 
  
In formulating their response, Sandys' lawyers turned to the same prominent European jurists whose 
arguments their continental colleagues had already been using for decades, as will be shown in the 
case studies. Scholars like Hugo Grotius and the Portuguese Seraphim de Freitas had  been discussing 
the issues of trade in Asia since the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century.  
 After the ruling against Thomas Sandys was handed down in 1685, advocates of the English 
East India Company started to find new ways to expand the  powers of their employer. In order to 
effectively combat interloping in India, a revision of the Charter in 1686 granted by James II, explicitly 
granted the Company the power to set up courts and appoint judges.
47
 In the Sandys case, some 
important links are established between the state's authority and the company. In his motivation of 
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the judgment, the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench first acknowledges that in principle, 
monopolies are prohibited:  
 
'I premise onely this, that in all those Countreys where Societies of Trade are erected by the Supreme 
Power exclusive of all others, as the Case at the Bar, Monopolies are forbidden, and are as severely 
punished by their laws as they can be by the Common and statute laws of England, viz. in Holland, 
Germany, France and Spain &c.'
48
  
 
There are several exceptions, however, that warrant the grant of a monopoly to a company. A 
monopoly is allowed if it serves the public interest and if foreign commerce, like that to the East 
Indies, can only be profitable through companies. If this is the case, others should not be able to 
profit from the costly venture of securing this trade by those companies. The Justice turns specifically 
to the Dutch chartered companies as evidence for the legitimacy of the EIC monopoly:
49
 
 
'In the United Provinces, the Laws against Monopolies are the same, yet there always were several 
Trading Corporations exclusive of all others, 3 June 1621. In the Charter of the Dutch West-India 
Company, it is granted thus; And in any case any one shall go to or negotiate in any of the aforesaid 
Places granted to this Company, without consent of the said Company, it shall be upon pain and 
forfeiture of such Ship and Goods, as shall be found to Trade in those Coasts and Places, which being 
presently and on all sides on the behalf of the said Company fet upon, taken, and as forfeited, shall 
be and remain to the Use of the said Company.'
50
 
  
A second line of defence for Sandys' lawyers had been to question the Company's standing. In order 
for the case to be admissible, they argued, the Company would have to show that the actions of 
Sandys had resulted in quantifiable damages. Was the EIC actually deprived of any profit by the his 
actions, or was there enough surplus trading opportunity to leave room for others? Thomas Sandys' 
lawyer pleaded that the injured party in this case was not actually the Company, rather it would have 
been the Crown because of the violation of a royal charter. This argument was rejected on the 
grounds that the Crown was not a party to this case.
51
 A similar discussion takes place in the opinions 
about the Coymans trial, as will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
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Views of contemporary scholars 
In many studies about the origins of the modern state, the Dutch Republic occupies a special 
position. Born out of the Eighty Years War, the Republic has taken a particular path of development 
that set it apart from other European states. The war gave rise to many discussions on the nature of 
sovereignty and autonomy; about the way power was distributed amongst cities, provinces, the 
Stadtholder and the States-General. The resulting scholarship did not unambiguously point towards 
the model of indivisible sovereignty propagated by French philosopher Jean Bodin.
52
  
The innovation of the chartered trading companies and the juridical challenges that it presented in 
overseas territories can be characterized as a 'legal anomaly'. At their inception, the legal status of 
the companies was unclear and hard to categorize and the grant of trading monopolies and 
sovereign privileges to the European trading companies did not go uncontested. 
Quickly however, European scholars took up the task of analyzing and trying to clarify this legal 
status, thereby touching on the principles of sovereignty and jurisdiction.
53
 A general reaction of legal 
scholars to the sweeping claims made by Spain and Portugal based on the Papal grants, was a turn 
away from canon law towards the use of Roman law sources for international law in the course of 
the sixteenth century.
54
 Prominent among these scholars was of course Hugo Grotius, who provided 
a legal justification for Dutch trading ventures in both the East and the West Indies.
55
 Dutch 
commercial expansion and the institutional innovation of the chartered trading company sparked an 
intellectual debate, not only in the Republic, but in the whole of Europe. A debate that dominated 
the discipline of political thought and connected commerce with traditional issues of sovereignty, 
jurisdiction and empire. The Dutch contributions to this discourse caught the attention of politicians 
around Europe, who looked to imitate the success of its growing commercial power.
 56
  
  
Pieter de la Court 
Whereas Grotius defended the freedom of the seas from a natural rights point of view, another 
(lesser known) Dutch thinker, Pieter de la Court took an economic approach to the subject. 
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Pieter de la Court (1618 - 1685), by some considered as a precursor to Adam Smith, was a fervent 
opponent of the chartered companies.
57
 However, in contrast to the theories of Hugo Grotius', which 
were held in high esteem in the Republic even after his conviction in 1618, Pieter de la Court's ideas 
did not get much attention in his homeland. His works would eventually be picked up in England in 
France in the course of the eighteenth century.
58
  
 De la Court realized the wealth of trading opportunities that the favorable geographical 
position in a river delta and on the coast of the North Sea, offered to Holland. Overseas trade had 
become the foremost source of wealth for the province. In his view, in order to maintain this 
prosperity, protection of shipping lanes against piracy, establishing more overseas colonies, 
upholding neutrality in international relations and concluding favorable trade treaties were 
warranted.
59
 His main arguments against the prevalence of the company monopolies concerned the 
exclusion of many capable people wishing to participate in this trade. Moreover, he argues, the 
people that are not excluded become unproductive and idle because they do not have to worry 
about competition. The chartered companies will only trade in those goods that yield the highest 
profits, but at the same time they exclude others from trading in less valuable goods. Lastly, the 
greedy companies are tempted to engage in pernicious practices like the willful destruction of goods 
in order to drive up prices. To sum up, de la Court agitates against the inefficient use of valuable 
labour and capital.
60
 However, his advocacy for free trade must not be understood as the promotion 
of a global free trade regime. His only concern was with the citizens of the United Provinces, for 
whom every artificial impediment to engage in overseas trade should be taken away.
61
 De la Court 
acknowledged  the merits of the foundation of the VOC in 1602 for a united defense against the 
Spanish but he was of the opinion that it had grown into a harmful institution that only served the 
self interest of the Directors.
62
 
 His neutrality principle did not preclude him from enumerating a number of possible reasons 
for Holland to engage in warfare. Unlike the just causes for war as laid out in the works of Grotius, de 
la Court does not give any real legal foundations for these reasons in his treatise Aanwijsing der 
politike gronden en maximen van de republike van Holland en West-Vriesland. His just causes for war 
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were the protection of the states' borders, to force foreign states to lift excessive tolls and duties, 
and the necessity to restore the balance of power in Europe.
63
 They mainly differ from Grotius' just 
causes for war (advanced in De Iure Praedae and later in De Iure Belli ac Pacis )in that the latter 
legitimizes the waging of private war when there is no public sovereign to administer justice. The 
private war can be waged to end a violation of (property) rights and to get compensation and inflict 
punishment for damages caused in the course of warfare. These rights were first laid out in reaction 
to the capture of the Santa Catarina and they give private trading companies a broad discretion to 
use violence in their overseas activities.
64
 
 In the third part of his treatise, de la Court considers the ideal political arrangement  for the 
state of Holland. In analyzing the constitutional relation of the companies towards the state he 
expresses the fear that the granted charters potentially made the companies too powerful and thus 
dangerous to the state: 
 
'[...] Ende hoewel men tot heeden nog geene oproeren uit de Geoctroyeerde Compagnien 
ontstaande heeft vernomen, soo is nogtans waarhaftig, dat deselve niet min, maar meer ten 
voordeele van eenige seer weinige, ende ten nadeele aller andere van dien Koophandel 
uitgeslootene Ingesetenen strekken, ende de gronden van Regeeringe in eene Regeeringe sig 
hebben, ende dat men dienvolgende metter tijd ook meer oproeren uit dien Hoofde, voornementlijk 
onder eene Vrye Regeeering, moet verwagten.'
65
 
 
De la Court argued that the intertwinement of commercial and public interest in the Dutch 
government was starting to take the shape of a government within a government. His proposed 
solution was to reign in the companies with the grant of a new charter that would make the Directors 
more accountable.
66
 The concern for a parallel government was a recurrent issue shared by others, 
as will be shown when we turn to the case studies discussed in later chapters. 
   
Hugo Grotius 
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was, as will appear in the following chapters when the cases are discussed, 
central in all matters concerning the Dutch chartered companies. As a scholar and as a legal 
professional Grotius would be involved with defending the practices of the Dutch trading companies 
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during his whole working life.
67
 For a good understanding of the legal underpinnings of these 
companies it is therefore necessary to take a look at his work and the extensive body of literature 
that has been written about it. Ever since he had been commissioned by the VOC in 1604 to write a 
defence of the Company's policy in the East Indies, Grotius had been a proponent of trading 
company involvement in overseas expansion.
68
 In his vision, the maintenance of a Dutch mercantile 
empire overseas could only be accomplished through the VOC and WIC as autonomous trading 
companies. Grotius distanced himself from his old friend van Oldenbarnevelt in his views on the 
trading companies. The latter had been a staunch opponent of the establishment of a West India 
Company, particularly in the context of Truce negotiations with Spain.
69
 The work Grotius was asked 
to write by the VOC in 1604 is titled De Iure Praedae Commentarius (Commentary on the Law of Prize 
and Booty) and the cause for this commission was the taking of a Portuguese carrack, the Santa 
Catarina, in the Strait of Singapore by Admiral Jacob van Heemskerck. De Iure Praedae was never 
published as an original work and it may never have been meant to be: in his correspondence, 
Grotius merely expresses the wish to further explore and build upon the specific subjects of the laws 
of war and natural law that he employs in the treatise. However, a revised version of chapter XII of 
the treatise was  published in 1609 as Mare Liberum, expressly to influence the Dutch-Spanish treaty 
negotiations.
70
 Mare Liberum is one Grotius' most famous works, in which he advocates the freedom 
of navigation on the high seas and the freedom of trade with foreign rulers based on natural law.  
 The manuscript of De Iure Praedae remained in possession of the de Groot  family after his 
death in 1645 and was only rediscovered in 1864 and auctioned off by Martinus Nijhoff to Leiden 
University. Robert Fruin would be the first to write an article about its supposed purpose and the 
implications for the valuation of Grotius' later works.
 71
 In De Iure Praedae, Grotius' view on company 
monopolies is expounded. The treatise attacks the Portuguese for exploiting their trading partners 
and for excluding other Europeans from trade in East Asia. He argues that in general, monopolies are 
prohibited. They are only allowed under the conditions that the monopolist will refrain from 
extracting excessive profits and that he excludes all other parties without exception.
72
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Recent scholarship on De Iure Praedae 
Recent years have seen a surge in the number of studies on Hugo Grotius and his early writings. 
These studies are part of a revisionism on the view of Hugo Grotius as the ‘father of modern 
International Law’. A position he mainly owed to the works of two Dutch jurists, C. van Vollenhoven 
and W.J.M. van Eysinga, early twentieth century proponents of the international arbitration 
movement.
73
 Contrary to the portrayal of Grotius as idealistic prophet of peace, as it was constructed 
by these nineteenth century jurists, he was more concerned with stating the law as it stood, rather 
than what it should be. Who possessed the rights to perform certain actions of public authority? Not 
necessarily the state. Public authority, in Grotius's view consisted of a number of rights, like the 
waging of war, make laws and administer justice.
74
 In his work De Iure Belli ac Pacis he also 
introduced the notion that an individual in its natural state carried the same rights as a state. The 
implication being that in situations where states were legally allowed to use force, an individual (and 
thus also the corporation) was equally in its right to do so.
75
 
 According to Peter Borschberg: 'Sovereignty is the foundation for understanding the 
theoretical construct of Grotius.' He argues that his notion of divisible sovereignty is indispensable 
for his legitimization of the design of the Dutch Republic itself and also for the operation of the 
trading companies overseas.
76
 In her book Profit and Principle, Martine van Ittersum engages in a 
rereading of De Iure Praedae in the context of the struggle of the Republic against subsequently 
Portugal, Spain and England. She reveals that one of the motives behind the writing of the treatise 
was to convince the States-General of the importance of supporting the VOC in its military and 
financial struggles in the East Indies. Her approach puts Grotius' theories in the context of historical 
events and by doing so van Ittersum shows that these acclaimed theories were very much grounded 
in practical concerns of the VOC and were immediately aimed at improving the Company's 
international standing.
77
 
 With regards to the issue of corporate sovereignty and the VOC, Eric Wilson has argued that 
De Iure Praedae has to be seen as reflecting the workings of the early modern World-System and the 
rise of a capitalist world-economy. He highlights the fact that Grotius managed to combine two 
'foundational pillars of International Law', being the concepts of the just war and the free seas. These 
two elements served as the legal underpinning for Dutch naval domination, the foundation of its 
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status as hegemon in the early modern World-System.
78
 First and foremost, Wilson argues, the 
treatise must be seen as aimed at gearing up the VOC, a private corporation, with public legal 
authority.
79
 This reading of De Iure Praedae obviously contradicts the view of Grotius as the founding 
father of the modern system of sovereign and equal states, the Westphalian state system. He makes 
an important point in explaining the seeming paradox between the view of Grotius as the father of 
this traditional Westphalian state-system, and the fact that De Iure Praedae was commissioned by 
the VOC to defend the interests of a private joint stock company. As the States-General realized the 
importance of the VOC in the war against Spain, the company was invested with an international 
legal personality and sovereignty, which in the traditional view of international law are only 
attributed to states and international organizations. This attribution of powers led to a 
interdependency between the State and the VOC and a balance between commercial and public 
interests. 
 Despite his concern for the rights of the Dutch trading companies under the law of nations 
and natural law, Grotius recognized that these applied mostly to the dealings of the companies in 
their competition with other European states. His view on the internal relation between the 
companies and the Dutch state was that the States-General was the competent body to issue and 
enact laws for the territories that the VOC and WIC had laid claims on. The sovereign powers of the 
companies would, in his view, be mostly limited to the external sovereignty: how to maintain 
relations with other states.
80
 Wilson points out however, that although Grotius considers the VOC to 
be subordinate to the States-General, in practice both bodies constituted 'a unified de facto 
organizational entity.' The political oligarchy and the Heeren XVII were 'one and the same, 
indistinguishable from each other and indeed often consisting of the same people. This was the 
reason for the apparent autonomy from metropolitan political control that the VOC enjoyed.' The 
oligarchic organization of the Republic was mirrored in the structure of the VOC.
81
 
 Together with Van Ittersum and Borschberg, Wilson finally arrives at the conclusion that De 
Iure Praedae was an important tool in the promotion of European imperialism. Their overarching 
conclusion is that Grotius' natural rights and contracts theory, by emphasizing absolute property 
rights and the freedom of the seas alongside the inviolability of contracts and the private right to 
punish transgressions in absence of public power, had laid the intellectual foundation for colonialism 
and imperialism.
82
 Additionally, Wilson calls attention to the similarities between the seventeenth 
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century and twenty-first century world system and the merging of public and private spheres.
 83
 His 
point is that two of the most important developments in international relations today are, firstly the 
gradual transfer of sovereignty to international organizations by states. Secondly , that neo-liberal 
theory, dominant in the West since the 1990s, has propagated the privatization of state activities. 
This includes activities that can be seen as the constituting the core of state prerogative, like the 
waging of war. As an example, one could point to the use of mercenaries by the United States in the 
Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The observation of these similarities might provide us with a starting 
point to rethink some of our old assumptions about the nature of the international state-system.  
I would argue that the value of that comparison can be questioned, as the differences between the 
seventeenth century Republic and the twenty-first century United States are too numerous to 
warrant a real comparison. To name one important difference: the Republic was an oligarchically 
ruled state, as opposed to the democratic federation of the United States founded on a constitution 
that clearly demarcates the limits of public powers. 
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II  WIC Charter and the 1629 Order of Government 
 
This chapter will shortly outline the provisions of the WIC Charter and related legislation issued by 
the States-General, that contain its public powers. First however, a short outline of the founding 
history of the WIC will be given for an understanding of the conditions under which the Company 
was conceived.  
 The Dutch had been trading on the west coast of Africa and America since the second half of 
the sixteenth century. A greater variety of merchandise, for which there was more demand in 
Europe, and shorter and safer journeys made this enterprise accessible to individual traders and 
smaller trading firms, as the initial investments were smaller and so were the risks.
84
 Impressed by 
the yields of a returning expedition  from Asia, in August 1600, Land's Advocate Johan van 
Oldenbarnevelt saw the promise of these overseas ventures. Sharp rivalry between the 
voorcompagnieën was however considered as a threat to the future of the business, especially while 
the Republic was faced with the ongoing war with Spain and Portugal. Van Oldenbarnevelt started 
lobbying for a unified company, able to defend itself in Asian waters, able to keep out interlopers and 
with enough capital to set up trading posts. His motivations were mainly of a military and political 
nature, as evinced by a speech he gave at a meeting of the States-General in 1601, where he stressed 
the importance of cooperation between the merchants, who:
85
 'being agreed and united should put 
their means and equipment together, under one rule and joint dealing, [...] for injury to the enemy 
and for the security of the country.'
86
 Van Oldenbarnevelt acknowledged the utility of a company 
that would be able to defend state interests, yet would be funded by private capital. During 
negotiation over the establishment of the Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie, Willem Usselincx' 
plans for a similar West Indian counterpart to this Company also resurfaced. However, the 
abundance of Spanish competition in the Atlantic trade made sure that Dutch participation in this 
trade in itself was not affecting market prices. So competition amongst Dutch traders did not lead to 
unwanted and inefficient results. Moreover, Spanish control over American harbors favored the use 
of small and agile convoys over heavily guarded fleet of traders.
87
 
 In 1602, the Charter to the United East India Company (VOC) was granted by the States-
General. During the negotiations for a Truce between Spain and the Republic, Oldenbarnevelt was 
experiencing difficulties with merchants that were served by a war with their commercial 
adversaries. At the same time, Spain was threatened by exploratory plans for a Dutch West India 
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Company.
88
 Eventually, the pressing demand for a Truce with Spain moved van Oldenbarnevelt to 
shelve Dutch plans for a West India Company as part of a compromise that allowed him to secure 
continued trade in Asia.
89
 Before the conclusion of the 1609 Truce, the Spanish had been troubled by 
Dutch traders targeting the riches of Spanish America, including sugar, tobacco, timber and salt. 
Dutch trading convoys were accompanied by privateers hunting down Spanish vessels. Following the 
expiration of the Truce, the Dutch were planning on returning to this lucrative enterprise.
90
 
After the trial of van Oldenbarnevelt in 1618, interested parties again saw their chance to attempt an 
appeal to the States-General for a charter. Differences between the Provinces and cities on the 
distribution of Chambers and participation delayed the foundation of the WIC a few more years, but 
eventually, in 1621, the States-General issued a charter modeled on that of the VOC. It was decreed 
that the duration of the WIC Charter would be 24 years and the granted geographical limits of the 
monopoly roughly covered North and South America and the coast of Africa south of the Tropic of 
Cancer.
91
 
 Compared to the successful VOC, the WIC would turn out to be a disappointment. Whereas 
the VOC was founded principally for commerce, the WIC was for a large part intended to be an 
instrument of war and its constant struggle with Spain and Portugal detracted from its function as a 
trading company. Despite these differences, concerning the issue of imperial sovereignty it is 
interesting to see that the States-General decided to pursue its political and military aims through 
the establishment of two joint stock companies. Thereby in essence privatizing one of the core 
functions of the early modern state: the waging of war.  
 
The Company Charter 
The constitutional position of the Dutch chartered companies was becoming a point of attention for 
scholars in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, at a time when the Dutch constitutional 
monarchy was taking shape. In 1841, J. Tak defended his dissertation at the Leiden University Faculty 
of law. Titled History of the Colonial Laws issued by the States-General of the Republic of the United 
Netherlands, it was translated from Latin in 1932 under the supervision of Cornelis van Vollenhoven, 
a renowned Dutch legal scholar who had done much groundbreaking work in the study of local 
Indonesian adat law. Van Vollenhoven acknowledged the importance of conducting more thorough 
research into the constitutional history of the Dutch West- and East-India Companies.
92
 Tak's 
promotor was the famous Dutch liberal Thorbecke, draftsman of the 1848 Dutch Constitution. 
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Thorbecke's interest in the matter was to argue that the States-General, and not the Dutch monarch, 
had been the lawful legislator for the Dutch East and West Indies and Tak's dissertation was written 
precisely in defense of these statements.
93
 
 The grant of a charter to a trading company by the government was, in itself, not an 
innovation. The English Crown had preceded the States-General in this regard by granting a charter 
to the Senegal Adventurers in 1588. More importantly, they had granted a charter to the East India 
Company in 1600, differing from the Dutch VOC and WIC Charters in this regard, that the  EIC Charter 
only concerned an exclusive trading concession for individual merchants equipping voyages to the 
East: no permanent capital was provided by the participants.
94
  
 The most important provisions in the WIC Charter containing its public powers are Article I 
and II. The first article functions as a kind of preamble, laying out the principal goals the States-
General in establishing a West India Company: 
 
'Be it known, that we knowing the prosperity of these countries, and the welfare of their inhabitants 
depends principally on navigation and trade, which in all former times by the said Countries were 
carried on happily, and with a great blessing to all countries and kingdoms; and desiring that the 
aforesaid inhabitants should not only be preserved in their former navigation, traffic, and trade, but 
also that their trade may be encreased as much as possible in special conformity to the treaties, 
alliances, leagues and covenants for traffic and navigation formerly made with other princes, 
republics and people, which we give them to understand must be in all parts punctually kept and 
adhered to [...]'
95
 
 
Furthermore, the article states that any violation of the monopoly will result in forfeit of the ship and 
cargo to the Company.
96
 Article II of the West India Company Charter granted by the States-General 
on June 3, 1621, embodies the bulk of its public powers. It grants the Company the authority to 
conclude treaties with foreign princes, to build fortifications and appoint military, judicial and civilian 
officials for the administration of its territories.
97
 The 1621 WIC Charter was modeled on that of the 
VOC and although the WIC is often seen as the Atlantic mirror image of the VOC, in practice there 
were important differences. Whereas the VOC monopoly, as laid down in the charter, could 
consistently be maintained, the WIC monopoly was subject to amendments, gradually opening up 
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parts of the Atlantic domain to outsiders. One of the main reasons for this development was that the 
WIC was constantly at war with the Spanish and Portuguese, which considerably weakened its 
position. These circumstances created the opportunity for individual merchants to disregard the 
monopoly without having much fear of getting caught. It resulted in continuous pressure to partially 
eliminate the monopoly. As successful trade in Asia was relying on the large capital investments 
which could be provided by a united company, undermining of the VOC monopoly was much harder 
for individual traders.
98
 The successful Dutch Atlantic trade that had existed before the founding of 
the WIC proved to be a debilitating factor in its operation. Some towns were disgruntled that they 
had been forced to give up their lucrative trade, for instance the salt trade in Venezuela. The greatest 
damage to WIC unity was caused by disagreement between the Chambers of Zeeland and 
Amsterdam. The Zeeland Chamber insisted on maintaining the monopoly in full force, whereas 
Amsterdam preferred to let private merchants be active within the Limits of the WIC Charter against 
payment. The dissension led to a partial lifting of the monopoly for Brazil in 1638.
99
 
 A second distinction between the WIC and VOC lies in the amount of government support 
both companies were receiving. The VOC, according to its charter was obliged to recompense the 
States -General in exchange for receiving a trading monopoly. No mention was made of possible 
financial backing by the government in the Charter. Although in the early decades of its existence the 
Company did receive a subsidy, after 1623 the state was actually profiting from the VOC payments. 
The WIC Charter, in contrast, contained some provisions guaranteeing military support.
100
 Article V of 
the Charter stipulates that the States-General shall make sure to provide the necessary soldiers (on 
Company payroll). In addition, Article XL, provides that in case of war, the WIC shall receive sixteen 
warships and four yachts, well outfitted and equipped with the necessary ammunitions.
101
  
Financial support had been given to the WIC since its founding.  The state bought half a million 
guilders in stock and granted another half million as a gift. Throughout most of its history, the 
Company would remain dependent on additional backing, even after its dissolution and subsequent 
reestablishment in 1674.
102
 
 In light of these differences in financial well-being between the two chartered companies, it 
has been stated that the WIC, other than was the case with the VOC, was actively controlled and 
supervised by the government as a kind of state enterprise. However, the states ownership of the 
Company did not exceed 7 percent of its total capital. The rest of the capital was provided by private 
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investors.
103
 Nevertheless, it took the WIC considerably more time and effort to attract the required 
capital. Decisive in finally achieving this was the decision by the States-General to include the salt 
trade on Punta de Araya into the Limits of the monopoly in 1622.
104
 Another conclusion concerning 
the involvement of the state, that was drawn in Tak's dissertation, is that the States-General 
apparently were more involved in the government of the WIC than in that of the VOC because one of 
the primary goals of the WIC was to govern overseas settlements.
105
 Despite this involvement by the 
States-General, at large distance from the metropolitan centre it would have been easy for colonial 
administrators to disregard government decrees in favor of pursuing their own interests, or the 
interests of the Company.
106
  
 A number of articles in the Charter were designed to prevent excessive  entangling of private 
and public interests. Article VIII states that there was no reciprocal obligation for the WIC to support 
the Republic with military forces in times of need. In Article XIX it is laid down that all important 
decisions concerning Company interests shall be taken by the General Assembly of the Directors. 
Only in cases of war, the States-General would have to be consulted.
107
 The Governors and other 
administrative officials were required to take an oath of loyalty to both the States-General and the 
Company (Article III). As were soldiers and military commanders in Company employment (Article 
VI). These were provisions aimed at keeping a degree of control over Company policy in overseas 
territory. Not surprisingly though, this seems to have been a dead letter requirement in practice.
108
 
 
Order of Government of 13 October 1629 
At the end of the first decade of its history, hopes for the future of the Company were high.  
Territories in Brazil were taken from the Portuguese and in the West Indies Curaçao, Bonaire and 
Aruba in 1634 were captured. The WIC Directors aspired to bring these and future possessions under 
a uniform statute, the Ordre van Regieringe soo in Policie als Justitie, inde Plaetsen verovert, ende te 
veroveren in West-Indien (Order of Government), enacted on 13 October 1629.
109
 The Order of 
Government was passed by the States-General and is generally regarded to be the operational 
statute of the WIC Charter. It can thus be considered to be the 'Constitution' of the West India 
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Company. The Order flows from the articles of the Charter and provides the material rules of 
government in the West Indies.
110
 It served a twofold purpose: as a legal foundation for a centralized 
government in the West Indies; and secondly, to maintain a degree of uniformity between the laws 
in the Republic, and the law in the colonies. (Although the Provinces all had their own, separate 
systems of law). The Order sub-delegates the public powers contained in the Charter to a central 
Council in seated in Brazil. The Council would get authority over the making of treaties with foreign 
rulers (art. XV), the administration of justice and maintenance of public order (art. LVIII) and the 
issuance of local decrees (art. LXII).
111
 However, as the conquests in Brazil started to suffer from a 
kind of 'mission creep' under continuing struggles with the Portuguese, without succeeding in 
expansion of the Brazilian colony, the ambitions of the Directors and the States-General to create a 
more uniform legal system for its territories in the West Indies eventually faded away. The 
experience accords with Lauren Benton's statements on the export of legal culture: 'Metropolitan 
efforts to construct internally consistent legal orders were desultory at best. Periods of energetic and 
often ineffective imperial legal planning interrupted longer spans of time when metropolitan officials 
mainly reacted to shifting circumstances and recognized the advantages of ad hoc solutions in loosely 
conforming to systems of law.'
112
 
  
Merger plans VOC and WIC 
In the end, the statesmen of the United Provinces always had several ways at their disposal in order 
to control and influence Company policy. Many of the regenten were able to hold more than one 
office at a time and were thus able to have both a seat in one of the Chambers of the WIC and to 
fulfill a political function.
113
 Another instrument was the temporary nature of the Charter granted by 
the States-General. The WIC charter was granted for a period of 24 years and whenever the 
expiration date drew near, there was the possibility of renegotiating the terms on which the 
Company was able to operate. In the 1640s, a public discussion was held about the possibility of a 
merger between the VOC and the WIC. The duration of its first Charter was nearing its end and the 
Company had not produced the results that had been expected at its inception. Anticipating the 
negotiations with the States-General for prolongation of the Charter, the WIC Directors came up with 
a bold plan. In 1644 they proposed a merger between their Company and the successful VOC, 
arguing that its success was to a large part owed to WIC activity in the Atlantic:
114
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'Nu en kan niemandt ontkennen dat onse hoochste betrachtinge, na de behoudenissse van onse 
Vryheyt en Godsdiensticheyt, behoort te zijn de bescherminge, vermeerderinghe, en bevestinghe van 
de Negotie, en Zeevaart deser Landen, ende consequentlijck de welvaert der Ingesetenen van dien, 
als de derde pilaer van desen Staet, door wiens kracht d'andere twee werden beschermt, bevesticht, 
en bewaert.'
115
 
 
The VOC Directors were however not willing to go along with this plan which, if realized, would result 
in a devaluation of their share price. The temporary character of the WIC and VOC Charters was a 
powerful tool in the hands of the States-General to align their interests with those of the state. So in 
the years leading up to the expiration of the charters, the States-General, and specifically the 
powerful States of Holland could exert their influence over Company policy. Yet still, the Directors of 
the VOC, backed by Amsterdam regent family interests, were able to resist demands for a company 
merger.
116
  When it became clear that the merger plans between the VOC and WIC were not going to 
work out, the States of Holland settled for a new proposal: the VOC would have to compensate the 
WIC financially. The required sum amounted to 1,5 million guilders, and after both companies had 
agreed, their charters were extended in July 1647.
117
  
 Wilson and Adams attribute the eventual decline of the WIC largely to the intercorporate 
competition and clashing familial interests. Now, if you define sovereignty as having 'supreme 
authority within a territory', the European chartered companies cannot be described as being 
sovereign entities. However, the merger episode shows that the States-General apparently could not 
just impose their will on the Directors of the VOC and WIC and were forced to engage in bargaining 
with the different interest groups involved.
118
 Secondly, concerning the autonomy of overseas areas, 
it can be said that for the duration of the Charter, the state retreated from some areas of 
government, like control over the overseas movement of its subjects, thereby limiting itself in its 
exercise of government.
119
 The trading posts and settlements could function as little pockets of 
sovereignty, resisting outside influences, while governance and administration of justice were 
entrusted to the bureaucracy of the companies in those settlements.
120
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III 'Creaturen van de Compagnie'. The Seizure of the Ship Alckmaer  
 
The case that is central to this chapter concerns a jurisdictional conflict between the WIC 
government in Brazil and a private trader sailing the Atlantic with a letter of commission from the 
Company. Seizure of the ship by the colonial government started a dispute about the legitimacy of 
the judicial jurisdiction of the WIC, that would eventually lead to intervention in the case by the 
States-General. The starting point for the case consists of a number of legal opinion by Dutch jurists, 
to be found in the archive of the States-General and in the Consultatien, Advijsen en 
Advertissementen. gegeven ende geschreven by verscheyden treffelĳcke rechts-geleerden in Hollandt.
 
The Consultatien is a six volume collection of legal advices and opinions by prominent Dutch legal 
scholars and lawyers, printed in the years between 1645 and 1666. It contains texts by jurists such as 
Hugo Grotius and Quirijn van Strijen.
121
 
 Despite initial troubles in gaining enough capital, the WIC got a financial windfall when Piet 
Heyn captured a Spanish fleet loaded with silver in 1628. This allowed the Company to launch an 
attack on Portuguese territories in Brazil. In 1630, the Dutch attacked the captaincy of Pernambuco, 
a wealthy sugar producing province. The towns of Olinda and Recife were quickly captured, however, 
it took another five years to subdue the Portuguese resistance in the entire territory.
122
 
Administration of the captured territories was put in the hands of the 'Political Council', an assembly 
of nine civilian officials, as regulated by the aforementioned 1629 Order of Government. However, 
this arrangement often impeded resolute and decisive action.
123
 Years spent fighting over 
Pernambuco put a heavy financial strain on the Company and greatly enlarged its debt. In order to 
get the necessary return on investment, the colony would have to be put under a reliable 
administration to make it stable and profitable. The Company directors decided to appoint Count 
Johan Maurits as governor-general in Brazil.
124
 He had been expressly commissioned to uphold the 
WIC trading monopoly as laid down in the Charter.
125
 The arrival of Johan Maurits in January 1637 
was accompanied by some reforms in the colonial administration. The governor would preside over a 
newly established body of four (including himself), the Hooghe en Secreete Raad  (High and Secret 
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Council).
126
 The Political Council also remained in existence, but it was expanded and tasked mainly 
with the administration of justice in civil and criminal cases, both in first instance and in the appeals 
phase. In accordance with the 1629 Order, the judges of the Political Council (or Council of Justice) 
would be applying Roman law and Dutch custom.
127
 The restructured government was based on an 
Instruction issued by the States-General in August 1636. It was a successor to the Order of 
Government, yet only aimed at administration of the colony of Brazil.
128
  
 Since the start of the attacks on Brazil 1630, the discussion about the Company's trading 
monopoly had flared up. The main proponents for maintaining the monopoly in the West Indies  
were the directors of the Chamber of Zeeland, de Maze and Stad en Lande. They had been able to 
convince the States-General to renew this privilege in 1636.
129
 As mentioned in the last chapter, their 
adversaries in this discussion were the Directors from Amsterdam, whose attitude towards the WIC 
had been hesitant since its foundation in 1621. Yet in 1638, they succeeded in bringing around the 
States-General on the issue of sanctioning free trade on Brazil.
130
 Unfortunately for the crew and 
owners of the ship Alckmaer, this occurred just a few months after the arrest and subsequent 
auctioning off of the ship and cargo. 
  Before sailing from the Netherlands in 1637 the ship's captain, Cornelis Pietersz. Croeger had 
secured  a license from The Directors of the Chamber of Maze in Dordrecht which permitted him to 
travel to São Thomé in return for a payment of the required fees. The agreement stipulated that in 
the event that there was no possibility to trade on São Thomé, the captain was allowed to sail to the 
West Indies to trade in timber, salt and tobacco to make up for their losses. These goods were 
exempt from the monopoly by the Heeren XIX. The salt trade within the Company's chartered limits 
had been liberalized in 1622, with the notable exception of the rich salt pans of Puncto del Rey. The 
timber, tobacco and cotton trade followed in 1637 by decree of the States-General and the Company 
Directors. The requirements to participate in this trade were authorisation from  one of the WIC 
chambers, the payment of a recognition fee, and keeping a daily journal of all the ships activities.
131
  
On arrival of the Alckmaer at São Thomé, five men disembarked to negotiate a trade with the people 
residing on the island. They did not succeed in concluding any agreement and were instead captured 
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and detained by the residents. In accordance with the contract and in order to secure their cargo, the 
captain subsequently decided to sail on to Pernambuco.
132
 
 The captain's secondary objective, as included in the agreement with the Maze Chamber, 
was to try to interfere with the Spanish trade in the West Indies: 'om den Cooninck van Spagnien 
affbreuck te doen'. In addition to granting this permission to Croeger, the Directors had given him a 
pack of missives addressed to Johan Maurits. These documents were handed over to the supracargo 
of the ship, De Bruijn, the official employed by the WIC who was charged with making sure that the 
captain of the ship stayed within the legally allowed limits of his license. On arrival in Pernambuco on 
25 August 1638, a delegation disembarked the ship and went to the High and Secret Council. They 
notified the Council of their intentions and requested to replenish their fresh water supply, unload, 
and sell the cargo before heading to the West Indies.
133
 The authorities of the Council decided to 
agree to the request and to let the ship resume its journey afterwards.
134
 However, while the captain 
and his commies Quesnoij were on land to deliver their letter, the local authorities had sent out a 
ship, the Vriesche Jager, to bring the Alckmaer into the harbor of Recife. Despite the commission 
granted by the Chamber of the Mase, the Political Council had approved the seizure of the ship. In 
their view, captain Croeger had overstepped his commission (which was limited to trade in timber, 
salt and tobacco) by bringing other goods, like wine and brandy to Brazil. To avoid any resistance by 
the crew that had remained on the Alckmaer, the crewmembers were promised to receive their 
monthly salaries, while the captain and his commies were arrested for violating the Company 
Charter. Despite protests by the accused over the impartiality of the judges, the Council decided on 
18 September that the ship and cargo would be forfeited to the Company, in accordance with Article 
I of the Charter.
135
 The convicted captain immediately made clear that he planned to seek revision of 
his sentence back in the Netherlands, to which the Council quickly reacted by sending the Heeren XIX 
a letter explaining what had occurred and why they had decided on seizing the ship.
136
 
 The owners of the ship, back in the Republic, claimed that the WIC had profited considerably 
from the sale. According to their calculation the sum of their loss amounts to more than 250.000 
guilders if lost interests would be taken into account.
137
 An appeal in June 1640 to the Directors of 
the WIC by the owners, led by Antonio Hendricxz., was rejected, which prompted them to turn to the 
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States-General.
138
 During the assembly of the States-General on September 8, 1641 the case was 
taken into consideration.  The representatives were of the opinion that it was not just a matter of 
importance for the injured party or for the West India Company. It could also set a precedent for 
future disputes and it was thus imperative that an accommodation would be reached. So, the States-
General sent the message to the Heren XIX, that they had to try to renegotiate a settlement. No 
resolution could be agreed upon. In 1643, the States-General decided to intervene on behalf of the 
owners of the ship Alckmaer. They ordered the Heren XIX to discuss the matter at their assembly and 
to look for an equitable solution to the conflict. Preferably one that would not lead to a judicial 
procedure. The resolution acknowledged the problem that had been put forward by the 
complainants: the Company being prosecutor, judge and beneficiary in the case of the ship's 
expropriation, which violated elementary principles of justice. 
 
'[...]de Westindische Compagnie in sulcken geval souden sijn aenclaegers, confisqueerders,  
Rechters, ende Genieters die niemants hooger jurisdictie en souden sijn, om alsoo tegens alle recht 
ende equiteijt te genieten (soo als men in desen van hun  supplianten soeckt te doen) der goede 
luijden hunne Schepen, goederen, ende middelen, derhalven ende aengesien haer ho: mo: goede 
intentie niet en wert voltrocken ende de voors; accomodatie bij de gemelte Compagnie hoe langer 
hoe verder vande hant wert geworpen ende t'enemael vruchteloos gestelt.'
 139
 
 
The Heeren XIX  kept emphasizing that there already existed a proper procedure for revision of the 
sentence, as laid down by the States-General in their instruction to the High Government of Brazil 
from August 23, 1636.
140
 And in case this would not result in a satisfactory solution, they would work 
to come to an amicable settlement as had been agreed on with the main participants in 1623. This 
policy was aimed at avoiding any judicial involvement in case of disputes.
141
 
 
Cloeck, Roch and Witte 
In November 1639, the States-General had received a brief prepared by Dutch legal scholars Joan W. 
Witte, Petrus Cloeck and Hercules Roch, all attorneys in Amsterdam. It contained a defense of 
captain Croeger, his crew and the ship-owners.
142
 They put forth a number of arguments in favor of 
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allowing the appellants to turn to either the High Court or the Provincial Court of Holland, Zeeland 
and West Friesland. 
 Their first line of attack concerns the impartiality of the WIC judges.  Citing the Roman law 
adage ne quis sua iuducet vel sibi ius dicat (no one shall be judge to his own cause), the authors 
question the judicial panel's impartiality in the case, because the Political Council, as representative 
of the WIC, served both as a beneficiary party in the case and as the judge casting the verdict. 
  
'Overmidts de Westindische Compagnie en de bewinthebbers der selver in alle gevallen gene hoge 
overicheydt sijn maer soo wel ondersaten van de hooge overheydt als de geinteresseerde in desen. 
Ende sulcx de voorsegde executie in saken van de hoge overicheydt plaetse hebbende, geensints tot 
andere particuliere persoonen, hoe machtich dat deselve mogen sijn, en mach werden 
geextendeert.'
143
 
 
They state that, as the interested party in the case, the WIC does not possess supreme authority, but 
is subject to the supreme authority, just as any individual. Therefore they cannot be said to have 
legitimately expropriated the owners of the Alckmaer. Moreover, they argued, the WIC authorities 
have acted in bad faith by  deceitfully leading the ship Alckmaer into the harbor in the absence of 
captain Croeger and chief merchant Quesnoij, who were in a meeting with Count Johan Maurits 
while the ship and its cargo were commandeered into the harbor and the crew was arrested. The 
third argument they put forward, turns to the law of nations. Taking the ship without a subpoena or 
any prior notice to the rightful owners, amounts to a violation of all divine, natural and international 
laws. Although Croeger and Quesnoij had been summoned to appear before court, the authors argue 
that the ship's captain and commijs were neither qualified, nor authorized to defend the interests of 
the ship's owners before the Political Council. Their mandate was limited to control over the ships 
course. There was no form of due process granted to the defendant, who had not been able to 
appear before the court with proper representation.
144
 
 Most importantly of course, the authors point to the license granted to the ship's captain by 
the WIC Chamber of the Maze. This should have constituted the required consent as mentioned in 
the article I of the Charter. Furthermore, the Charter prohibits sailing and conducting trade without 
consent within the Limits of the Charter. However, as the ship had only sailed near, but not traded 
on, the coast of Brazil it is argued that the Company had no right of confiscation. Surely, the 
Company cannot pretend to have incurred any damage by the mere sailing of the ship within the 
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limits. The documents brought on the ship by the supracargo stipulated that the Alckmaer was 
allowed to navigate to Brazil in order to buy timber, tobacco, salt and cotton. Trading in any other 
goods within the territories falling under the WIC Charter was still prohibited for private traders, but 
by staying out of the harbor of Recife the captain clearly expressed his intention not to do so. The 
Company cannot claim to have trading privileges on the open sea: 'alsoo de Compagnie immers in 
zee eygentlijck gene negotie heeft'. There is nothing in the Charter suggesting a prohibition to go 
onto land when there is no intention to conduct any trading activities. In fact, in order to deliver the 
missive to Johan Maurits, Croeger had no other option but to go onto land. And the secondary 
objective, to try to do as much damage to Spanish commerce as possible, gave them the right to 
navigate the Atlantic ocean.
145
 Moreover, they had a natural right to do so, the jurists argued 
referring to Grotius' Mare Liberum: because the ship Alckmaer was in open water and had not 
entered the harbor of Pernambuco, the guileful seizure of the ship had been committed contrary to 
the law of nations, natural law and general custom.
146
 Finally, it appears from the testimonies given 
by the ship's crew, that since their departure from São Thomé, the ship had been short on fresh 
water. It had already been rationed and it would not have been possible to return to Holland without 
first stopping in either Brazil or the West Indies to restock. Fear of looming mutiny and growing 
resentment against the ship's officers led them to decide to take a detour to Pernambuco after 
consulting with supracargo de Bruijn. So despite any finding by the prosecutor on the (il)legality of 
sailing to Brazil: 'noot breeckt Weth'. The state of necessity overrules the provisions of the Charter.
147
 
Returning to the necessity of a revision of the sentence, Cloeck and Witte conclude that any potential 
judges presiding over an appeals trial in Brazil, can equally considered to be 'Creaturen van de 
Compagnie', as they would also be drawn from the WIC government in Brazil. Citing precedents from 
cases that played before the Provincial Court of Utrecht and a case between the Magellan Company 
and the VOC, they point out that the States-General has shown itself willing to order a revision in the 
past.
148
  
 The complaints voiced in this brief give an insight in the difficulties that could arise with the 
regards to the governmental powers exercised by the WIC in their territories. Although one cannot 
compare the seventeenth century judicial practice with that of today, which is distinguished by a 
strict regard for separation of powers and a guarantee of due process, it appears that exercise of 
sovereign powers by a private company could very easily lead to conflicts of interest, and that these 
problems were recognized and of concern to contemporaries.  
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A second significant point is the fact that the Amsterdam lawyers refer to Grotius' Mare Liberum, a 
treatise originally published to defend Dutch trading interests against foreign interference.
149
 This 
brief shows that the authoritative work by Grotius was not only useful in the context of international 
disputes on the freedom of the seas; the law of nations was also used in conflicts between the WIC 
and Dutch citizens. 
 
Consultatien,  Advijsen & Advertissementen 
The second legal advice concerning this case can be found in the Volume V of the Consultatien which 
contains a short treatise by a man named P. van Peene on the matter of jurisdiction of the Political 
Council in Brazil. Together with D. de Jonge, J. van Andel and Ijsbrant Craft (most likely all four were 
lawyers from The Hague)
150
, van Peene had written an earlier legal opinion on the case, presented to 
the States-General on 9 December 1639.
151
 
 The first question he addresses concerns the competency of the judges in first instance in a 
dispute between the WIC and the owners and captain of the Alckmaer. Van Peene emphasizes the 
fact that the Instruction of 1636, regulating the judicial authority of the Government of Brazil, was 
granted by the States-General. Ergo, all powers exercised by this Government are derived from the 
sovereign power of the States-General.
152
 Articles 42 to 56 of the Instruction deal with the criminal 
and civil jurisdiction exercised by the Political Council.
153
 Articles 42 and 50 stipulate that the 
competence of the Political Council as judicial body is limited to criminal cases in first instance and 
civil cases in appeal. Moreover, this competence is limited to inhabitants of the settlements and 
outposts occupied by the WIC and those who do business within these territories, so the Political 
Council had overstepped the boundaries of its jurisdiction. The fact that the Alckmaer was towed 
into the harbor by the Vriesche Jaeger under false pretense excludes the competency of the Council  
in this case. Van Peene goes on to state that Article 1 of the WIC Charter does not stipulate that 
every ship violating the limits of the Charter is automatically forfeited to the Company after arrest by 
the authorities. It must be read to say that such a ship may be arrested in order to initiate judicial 
proceedings before the competent court in the Netherlands.
154
 The second argument again denies 
that Croeger and Quesnoij enjoyed the mandate to defend the interests of the ship's owners in court. 
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Any arrest of ships or goods has to be followed by the ordinary legal procedure at the competent 
court, in this case being a court in the Republic, against the rightful defendants, in this case being the 
owners of the ship.
155
 
 Finally on January 27 1646, the States-General concluded that the conflict between the 
owners of the ship and the WIC should be brought before a court back in the Netherlands.  
The case would be tried in revision, before a mixed court of judges, drawn from both the Provincial 
and High Courts of Holland and Zeeland. The resolution calls for both parties to submit their evidence 
and legal briefs to the judges of the Court.
156
 Unfortunately, I have not been able to find any 
evidence of the proceedings or verdict of this case, so it is impossible to say what the fate of the 
owners and captain of the ship has been. From the findings in chapter II one could draw the 
conclusion that the States-General exercised more authority over the WIC and its territories than 
they did over the VOC because the founding of the former company was more tied up with the 
state's purpose of waging war against the Iberian power. Paradoxically however, by designing a 
'constitution' for these territories, the state was also withdrawing from areas that are the 
prerogative of the sovereign. Leaving the administration of justice in the hands of a private company 
led to a situation in which a private company could be judge in his own cause, easily letting its own 
commercial interests prevail. Although it has been concluded in the last chapter that the WIC was, de 
iure, not a sovereign entity, the reality seems to be more complicated, as brought to the attention by 
Wilson: 'The state is vacating traditional areas of concern, creating pockets  of empty juridico-
political spaces that are increasingly coming to be occupied by corporations or other forms of 'private 
actors'.'
157
 Judges and legislators were often drawn from the same pool of regenten and combined 
different functions. Conflicts of jurisdiction were inevitable in an informal system which lacked clarity 
on the position of the Company courts in relations to the domestic courts of the Republic.
158
 
Apparently the mismanagement in this case was recognized by the States-General, which tried to 
repair the situation by intervening in the present case. But it might also be that Antonio Hendricxz. 
had powerful friends in either the States of Holland or the States-General, who could move the 
assembly in this direction. Presumably there would have been more cases, similar to this one, where 
the lack of a proper appeals mechanism allowed the overseas administrators of the WIC to judge 
arbitrarily and without proper motivations. Then why did this particular case end up on the agenda of 
the States-General? This in itself is probably also a show of arbitrariness and purely based on 
personal connections between the ship's owners and powerful members of the regent class: the 
powerful bond between merchant and government interests that lay at the basis of the young 
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Republic's functioning. For this case, and similarly for the Coymans trial, we see that in the decision 
to prosecute, or in the decision by the States-General to intervene, what mattered most was not a 
sense of justice or a concern for the constitutional guarantees of the legal system. In the end these 
decisions depended on the split interests within the ruling class of the regenten.
159
 The dominance of 
commercial interests within the government, resulted in an oligarchic and weak central government 
and it can be argued that it was precisely this dominance that has led to Dutch success, especially in 
Asia.  It guaranteed that the Dutch trading companies would be free from too much government 
interference thereby securing the favorable conditions needed for prosperous trade.
160
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IV The Trial of Isaac Coymans 
 
Whereas the dispute in the last chapter took place against the background of the struggle by the WIC 
to defend its colony in Brazil, the case of Isaac Coymans has its origins in another contested area, the 
coast of West-Africa. Again, the significance of this case will appear from a number of legal opinions 
by Dutch jurists. They show us that the exact legal dimensions of the Company were a topic of 
concern and ongoing debate. Their frequent use of Hugo Grotius' treatises reaffirms his prominence 
in the seventeenth century Republic. For historical context, I will first give a short outline of the 
history of the WIC with regard to its activities in this region.  
 The first European presence in the region was formed by the Portuguese, who arrived there 
at the end of the 15th century establishing trading posts and contacts with the local African 
kingdoms. In the following centuries the Portuguese would be followed by the Dutch, English, 
Swedes and Danes. The European powers were drawn to the region by lucrative trade in gold, ivory 
and slaves. The Portuguese were soon chased out by the competing and increasingly powerful 
European powers. Dutch possessions on the west coast of Africa had been administered by the 
States-General in the first few years since the founding of the WIC. The Company finally got control 
over these possessions in 1624. The main trading Portuguese trading posts and forts lay on the Gold 
Coast and in Angola, from where they could provide their plantations in Brazil with slaves. In the 
years between 1625 and 1637 the WIC succeeded in securing a foothold on the Gold Coast providing 
the opportunity to get involved with the transatlantic slave and gold trade. Besides the use of 
military force, the Company employed the tactic of building alliances with local kingdoms, by 
concluding treaties with its leaders, in order to build opposition to the Portuguese presence.
161
 
 A second important focus point of their strategy in Africa was the capture of St. Paolo de 
Loanda in Angola, a major slave station. In 1640 a newly independent Portugal had expressed the 
wish to come to a peace settlement, pressuring Johan Maurits to act swiftly, as he desired to expand 
the WIC territory in Africa. The maintenance of these positions turned out to be too expensive, 
however, and in 1648 Loanda and Sao Thomé were returned to the Portuguese.
162
 After the capture 
of Loanda, Count Johan Maurits tried to persuade the States-General and the WIC Directors to put 
the newly acquired territory under the governance of the Government of Brazil, regulated by the 
1629 Order of Government. To no avail, as it was decided that the new territory would fall under 
direct jurisdiction of the Chambers in the Republic.
163
 Meanwhile, the Dutch outposts on the Gold 
Coast were coming under increasing pressure from new competition: English and Scandinavian 
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trading companies. It was the founding of the Swedish and Danish Africa Companies that would set 
the stage for the events of the Coymans case, and the conflict between Denmark and the Republic 
discussed in chapter V.
164
 
 The episode of the conflict between Denmark, Sweden and the Republic starts with a group 
of venturous merchants from Amsterdam, to which Coymans belonged, seeking ways to participate 
in the lucrative African trade outside of the limits imposed by the WIC Charter. In an article published 
in 1889, N. de Roever delves into the history of the Scandinavian companies. With unequivocal 
disapproval he writes about the likes of Isaac Coymans, who tried to undercut the WIC monopoly on 
the Coast of Guinea: 
 
'Waar alzoo met onmiskenbare duidelijkheid bewezen wordt, dat de vaderlandsche zaak met den 
bloei der Compagniën verwant werd geacht, daar mag men vragen, welk oordeel moet worden 
uitgesproken over hollandsche kooplieden, die enkel en alleen uit winstbejag het hunne er toe 
bijdragen, om de welvaart en het prestige van de West-Indische Compagniën te ondermijnen in 
Afrika op een oogenblik, dat zij de handen vol had in Amerika'
165
 
 
However one might value this judgment, the author is right assessing the awkward situation both the 
States-General and the WIC were confronted with, as the Amsterdammers were conducting their 
operation under the flags of the Swedish and Danish Crowns, allies of the Republic. 
 Although the Swedish and Danish Africa Companies were only small in comparison to the 
WIC, they tried to gain the favour of local ruling elites, whose support they needed against the 
military power of the Dutch.
166
 Central in this strategy was a man named Hendrick Caerloff, a German 
former WIC employee that had started his career on the island of São Thomé and who quickly gained 
much experience in the African trade acting as a liaison with local rulers. In 1649, while Caerloff 
resided in Amsterdam, he was employed by the Swedish Africa Company founded by Dutch 
industrialist Lodewijk de Geer in 1647. In the service of the SAC, Hendrick went back to the Gold 
Coast to negotiate with African chiefs and acquire the rights to build trading posts and forts. 
However, after the death of de Geer things went downhill for Caerloff's 'Swedish' career.
167
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 After a falling out with the Directors of the Swedish Africa Company (SAC) in 1657, a 
disgruntled Caerloff decided to use his considerable experience within the WIC and the SAC to set up 
a new enterprise. First, he obtained a privateering commission from the Danish king Frederik III to 
sail to West Africa and retake the settlements he had initially obtained for the Swedes. During his 
departure from the port of Glückstadt, the kingdom of Sweden and Denmark were at war with each 
other. However, in his absence they signed a peace treaty, brokered by the Dutch and English, and 
on his return in to Glückstadt in 1658 the Swedes had issued a warrant for his arrest. Caerloff 
managed to escape to Amsterdam and decided to order his representative on the African Coast, 
Samuel Smidt to sign over the possessions (as Caerloff regarded himself the rightful owner) to WIC 
Director-General Jasper van Heussen.
 168
 His actions in no way proved to be an obstacle for the 
opportunistic Caerloff to subsequently turn to the Danish authorities only a few days later and set up 
the Danish Africa Company in participation with Jan de Swaen, Nicolaas Pancras and Isaac Coymans, 
all merchants from Amsterdam. This decision turned out to be the starting point for conflict between 
the WIC and the DAC concerning sovereignty over the outposts. Also, the WIC was starting to get 
worried about the Danish competition and looked for ways to dispose of the Dutch participants.
 169
 
   
Isaac Coymans 
On January 24, 1662, the merchant from Amsterdam named Isaac Coymans was convicted by the 
Amsterdam Schepenen Court and condemned to serve six years in prison. In addition to his 
imprisonment he had to pay a fine of 20.000 Carolus guilders and he would be banished from the city 
after serving out his sentence. It was a surprisingly light sentencing, considering the crime that he 
had been found guilty of: the crime of treason. A crime that would normally result in a death 
sentence.
170
 The trial, which was highly publicized in the Republic, was part of a newfound 
persistency to maintain the WIC trading monopoly in the face of fierce competition on the coast of 
Guinea by Sweden, Denmark and England.
171
 
 Isaac Coymans, born in Amsterdam in 1620, belonged to a well known merchant family from 
Hamburg. In 1638 he moved to Guinea in the employment of the WIC. Starting out as an assistant, 
during the 1640s he moved up the ranks and became an accountant and later deputy commies.
172
 
He is frequently mentioned in Vijf dagregisters van het kasteel São Jorge da Mina, an account of WIC 
activities in West Africa in the years between 1645 and 1647. It provides us with an outline of his 
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career advancements and his activities as accountant and negotiator with local rulers. During his 
years on the African outpost, Coymans would meet Hendrik Caerloff, his future partner in the Danish 
Africa Company.
 173 
His career resembled that of Caerloff, who had also started as an administrative 
servant of the Company, and was soon promoted to management positions on the coast of 
Guinea.
174
 Coymans' experience in the service of the WIC would serve him well later in life, on his 
return to Amsterdam after 1649, when he became involved in the Scandinavian episode.
175
 Together 
with Coymans, a companion of his, named Gerard van Tets, was arrested and charged with the 
treason. Van Tets had also been working in the service of the WIC in Guinea during the 1640s in a 
number of capacities. He had been deputy commies at Fort Nassau, later moving to fort Chama as 
commies.
176
  
 Coymans' arrest resulted from the capture of the Danish ship Postillon van Venetien by the 
WIC. The ship was carrying two letters written by Coymans to Joost Cramer, commander of the 
Danish regiment at Cabo Corso.
177
 In the first letter, dated 25 March 1660, Coymans writes about 
some rumours he picked up, that the WIC was equipping ships to take fort Cabo Cors from the 
Danish Company by force. He advises Cramer to hire locals to help him fend off company attacks, 
after assuring him that the WIC has no rightful claims on the fort. A second letter, dated 13 July 1660, 
further clarified Dutch plans. They were looking to get rid of the Acrosan Jan Claessen, an African 
who controlled trade from the kingdom of Futu with the European merchants. More specifically: 'dat 
de Compagnie op middelen dencken om Jan Klaesz. vergift te doen suypen, oft wel anders den hals 
te laten breecken.' Coymans urged Cramer to warn Claessen and to let him attack nearby Fort 
Nassau, as revenge in case of a Dutch strike.
 178
 
 The verdict by the court was based on these two letters and a confession by Coymans on 6 
January 1660 in which his aims in writing those letters were further explained. During the 
interrogation of Coymans by the Schepenen court, the question of territorial sovereignty over 
territories on the Coast of Guinea becomes a point of discussion. Asked about whether he knew that 
Fort Nassau would be occupied by Company soldiers, Isaac replied that he was aware of this, 
however: 
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'Maer dat de Compagnie daer vorders niet een wet eygen heeft alsoo alles staet ondergebiet vande 
Swarten ofte koning van Sabou. Segt oock te verstaen dat de Compagnie noch eijgendom noch 
superioriteijt in dat landt heeft, maer dat sij maer alleen hebben een vergunninge van negotie die 
haer van de inwoonders wert toegelaten.'
179
 
 
Thereby rejecting Company claims of sovereignty in this region. As will be discussed later, this 
accords with the general position that would be taken by the lawyers of the Danish Africa Company 
in their petitions to the States-General to rein in the privateering activities of the WIC. 
 
Legal consults 
The trial against Coymans was highly publicized and caught the attention of legal scholars throughout 
the Republic. The opinions of these legal scholars, both opponents and proponents of the arrest and 
subsequent charges, were published in a pamphlet: Brieven, confessie; mitsgaders, advisen van 
verscheyden rechtsgeleerden in de saeck van Isaac Coymans gegeven; als mede de sententie daer op 
gevolgt printed in Rotterdam in 1662.
180
 Besides lawyers and scholars from the province of Holland, 
the authors include renowned jurists from Utrecht and Friesland, indicating that the issues addressed 
disconcerted many throughout the United Provinces. 
 The treason conviction by the Amsterdam judges was based on the position that a violation 
of the WIC monopoly as laid down in its Charter, constituted an act of treason against the Republic. 
The main point of contention in the published briefs concerns the following question: do the actions 
of Coymans constitute an act of treason, or can they only be punished as a breach of the Company 
charter? In other words, what is the constitutional position of the WIC? Is it a private enterprise 
carrying a number of public powers derived from its Charter, or is it a fully fledged agent of the state, 
acting as a substitute and representative of the sovereign States-General in its overseas territories? 
One of authors included in the pamphlet is Jacob de la Mine from Amsterdam (which is most likely a 
pseudonym referring to castle Elmina), who in the following passage touches upon the essence of 
this question: 
 
'[...] [D]at aengesien de West-Indische Compagnie van dese  Vereenighde Nederlanden, niet 
simpelijck is een Compagnie van verscheyde kooplieden ende Geinteresseerdens te samen, om tot 
profijt en voordeel van de selve in het particulier negotie te drijven; maer dat het selve is een 
Collegie by publique authoriteyt en speciale Octroy van de Hoog: Moog: Heeren Staten Generael 
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deser vrye Vereenighde Nederlanden, tot den welstant van de selve Landen, ende uytbreydinge van 
de Limiten van het gebiet ende gesach van den Staet opgerecht ende gestabilieert: Soodanigh dat de 
selve Compagnie in de gewesten die in de Limiten van het voorsegde Octroy zijn begrepen, niet als 
perticuliere Negotianten leven ende ageren, maer aldaer representeren de Hoogheydt ende de 
Souverainiteyt van hare Hoog: Moog: de Heeren Staten Generael.'
181
 
 
De la Mine supports his statement by listing those provisions of the WIC Charter covering the relation 
between the States-General and the Company (discussed above in chapter II). Considering these 
articles he argues that the resulting conclusion must be that, although the granted powers might 
prima facie be exercised by a sovereign entity, in reality they flow from the authority of the state.
182
  
 Moreover, he argued that although it might be true that Coymans was not acting with the 
intention of damaging the interests of the United Provinces but only out of an aversion against the 
WIC, this does not change the fact that he advises Cramer to commit an act of war against the Dutch: 
incitement to overthrow the legitimate government of the Republic. Resulting in a state of war 
between the two parties. This is an act in violation of natural law. As Grotius explains in De Iure Belli, 
generally it is not permitted for private actors to wage war against the state, unless the state itself 
orders those actors to perform acts prohibited by natural law.
183
 Accordingly, it does not matter that 
Joost Cramer is the subject of a friendly state, incapable of bringing offence to the Dutch, as Coymans 
claims in his letters, for if he acted on this advise he would become an enemy of the state. Nor does 
it matter that the crimes discussed by Coymans were not actually perpetrated, as the special 
character of crimen laesae majestatis stipulates that only conspiring to damage the state is 
sufficient.
184
 
 Jurists Gaspar Fagel, Martin van der Goes and Willem van Strijen agree with de la Mine and 
reaffirm his position on the relation between the States-General and the WIC:
185
 
 
'[...] [G]heconsidereert de West-Indische Compagnie is een Collegie, daer inne de Hoog: Moog: 
Heeren Staeten Generael in de Limiten van des selfden Octroy, haer Souverainiteyt doen bestaen, 
ageren ende leven, ende dat sulcks 't geen tegens de voorsegde Limiten wert gecommitteert, 
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effectivelijck werdt gecommitteert tegens de Hoogheydt en Souverainiteyt van de opgemelte Heeren 
Staeten-Generael.'
186
 
 
They refer to Coymans letter from 13 July 1660, in which Coymans assures Cramer that the Danes 
won't be able to get any compensation for injuries inflicted by the WIC, through judicial channels.  
Therefore he advises Cramer to seek revenge by using the troops under command of Jan Claessen. 
By encouraging Cramer to pit the Africans, formerly loyal to the WIC, against the Dutch, Coymans has 
committed unlawful acts against the state.
187
 
 The arguments raised by those who reject the claims of treason can be summarized by two 
main points. First, they consider the WIC to be a private society of merchants, not a public body of 
the state, notwithstanding the powers granted to it in the 1621 Charter. Second, the writing of 
letters by Coymans to Joost Cramer does not constitute a criminal act, it must be classified as 
correspondence with an ally of the Republic. Subjects of the States-General are allowed to maintain 
good relations with its foreign allies. Moreover, derived from this second argument, they find it 
indeed commendable that Coymans tried to warn a personal friend and ally of the state of the 
mischievous plans of the WIC to kill Cramer and attack Cabo Corso. These actions do not even 
constitute a violation of the Company monopoly, as there was no illegal trafficking of goods 
involved.
188
 There is disagreement between these experts however, on the question of Company 
sovereignty over its overseas territories. Some reject all WIC claims of territorial jurisdiction.  
 Paulus Voet, a jurist from Utrecht and father of the renowned Johannes Voet argues, 
together with others, that the scope of crimen laesae majestatis cannot be extended to cover acts 
damaging WIC interests. The Company does not represent the  state in the Netherlands, nor in 
Guinea. This opinion clearly finds it origin in a work published by Voet in 1661, De Statutis eorumque 
concursu Liber Singularis. The treatise is a clear expression of the absolute territorial sovereignty of 
the state in the area of private international law, a legal area that deals with conflict of different legal 
systems in the relations between private individuals. According to the theory of statutism, which 
originated in the northern Italian city states, laws enacted by equal sovereigns cannot create 
obligations within the territory of the other sovereign. Unless the sovereign, as an expression of 
comity, consents to the extraterritorial functioning of a foreign statute. These acts of comity between 
Italian city states, which all had their own legal codes, would facilitate the trade relations amongst 
each other. Not surprisingly, this theory appealed to Dutch jurists, as the Provinces of the United 
Netherlands also used separate legal codes and customs. There was no overarching law for the 
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whole Republic, but the rise of the Dutch commercial empire necessitated the use of new legal 
theories.
189
 
 Voet states that the WIC was not in possession of Fort Nassau: the occupation of the fort by 
Company soldiers merely served to secure Dutch trade on the coast and it was only possible with 
consent from the territorial sovereign, the king of Sabou. Moreover, any concessions made by the 
king with regards to exercise of jurisdiction by the company were made to the WIC and not to the 
States-General.
190
 According to Voet the Company did not have any territorial rights in West-Africa: 
'[...] overmits de voorschreven Compagnie het Fort Nassouw, niet als een Plaets tot desen Staet 
specterende, zijn besittende, maer alleen met Garnisoen beset hebben tot securiteyt van hare 
Negotie, bij toelatinge van de Koninck van Sabou.'
191
 
 Nevertheless, there was extraterritorial operation of Dutch law in the coastal outposts. Civil 
and criminal conflicts between subjects of the Company and Africans occurred from time to time and 
in these cases the question arose of what law would have to be applied. In general, Company officials 
served as mediators in these cases, trying to manage peaceful resolution of the disputes. As a last 
resort the WIC could serve as a judge in the case. This can be seen as an act of comity on the part of 
the African rulers in theory, but of course in practice there was no equality between two sovereign 
partners. The Dutch had continued the practice started by the Portuguese and acted as a suzerain 
with regard to the local rulers.
192
 
 A group of prominent lawyers from The Hague issued an opinion on the extent of the WIC's 
territorial jurisdiction. Among those signing the opinion were Willem van der Kerckhoven, Cornelis de 
Neyn and Hendrick Cloeck, who would later become judges at the Provincial Court of Holland.
193
 
Another signatory was Willem de Groot, Hugo's younger brother who had also gained some fame in 
the legal profession as a lawyer for the VOC and who had closely worked with him on his famous 
publications.
194
 Not surprisingly he seems to endorse his brothers thoughts about the legal 
dimensions of the trading companies (as it is interpreted in the recent scholarship by Borschberg, van 
Ittersum and Wilson). Firstly, they argue, the Company is not an entity able to exercise territorial 
jurisdiction within the Republic and Isaac Coymans is not a subject of this entity pretending to be a 
state, against which treason can be committed. This would make it a state within a state: 'tanquam 
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Imperium in Imperio, aut Majestas in Majestate [..]', which is exactly the fear that would be 
expressed by Pieter de la Court a few years later in his Aanwijsing der heilsame politike Gronden en 
Maximen. However, it is subsequently emphasized that within the geographical limits specified in the 
Charter, the Company is sovereign over those settlements, forts and territories that it possesses. 
Therefore, treasonous activities perpetrated within these Limits against the WIC could constitute 
crimen laesae majestatis, provided that the perpetrator is in the service of said Company.
195
 The 
conclusion that can be drawn from this reasoning is that the abovementioned authors considered 
the WIC to possess autonomous authority within their overseas outposts. The question of a finding 
of treason depended upon the matter of employment by the company, or residence within its 
territories. For Coymans, neither condition was fulfilled. In chapter XIII of De iure praedae, Grotius 
comments on the relationship between the States-General and the VOC: 
 
'In the first place then, it is a generally accepted fact that the individuals who compose the East India 
Company are subject to the said States-General. For all persons within the territory in question have 
pledged allegiance by oath to that assembly, or else tacitly give adequate assurance, by making 
themselves part of the political community governed by the latter, of their intention to live in 
accordance with the customs of this community and to obey the magistrates recognized by it. Such 
an assurance (as we have pointed out in another passage) is no less binding than the spoken 
word.'
196
 
 
Now, since De Iure Praedae was only rediscovered in 1864, these seventeenth century jurists cannot 
be expected to have had any knowledge of its contents. However, it is of course not unthinkable that 
the brothers de Groot discussed these matters with each other, exchanging views on the issue of the 
Companies' legal position. The opinion accords with Eric Wilson's interpretation of De Iure Praedae 
to the extent that the treatise upholds the distinction between private and public, but by attributing 
the Company with the necessary tools to protect its property overseas, it becomes a state-like entity. 
In other words, the Company is subordinate to the public authority of the States-General, yet in 
practice it becomes a 'Corporate Sovereign' as the States-General grants parts of its sovereign 
powers to the private body and vacates those areas itself.
197
 This concept entails that as a matter of 
law, the state exercises control over the corporation. However: 'As of fact, private actors exercise 
decisive structural power over national politics and economics. The outcome is a radical iterability 
between public and private "sovereignty", both sectors perpetually interfering in the 'internal 
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operations' of the other.'
198
 A second point that stands out is the fact that Coymans was not in the 
service of the WIC anymore during his correspondence with Cramer. In other words, he was not a 
subject of the WIC. This affirms the early modern view on sovereignty, in which the element of 
territory was not as pivotal as today. The more essential concept was that of subjecthood because: 
'subjects could be located anywhere, and the tie between sovereign and subject was defined as a 
legal relationship, legal authority was not bound territorially.'
199
 
 Law professor Johannes Christenius follows the line set out in the other opinions written in 
defense of Coymans. He adds the notion that the WIC has to be equated with any other citizen of the 
state. An offense against a subject of the state, does not automatically lead to an offense against the 
state itself: 
 
'dat soo wanneer in een koninghrijck ofte Republijck eenige Stadt ofte onderhoorigh Lidt eenighsins 
gelaedeert wordt, terstont de hooghste Macht moste verstaen worden gelaedeert te zijn, het welcke 
de Rechten in geenderley manieren toelaten'
200
 
 
Finally, based on the consultations with these jurists, Coymans' lawyer (sadly he remains anonymous) 
sets out to construe his argument. The implication of a finding of crimen majestatis laesae would be 
that the WIC possesses the highest authority, in other words, that it would be sovereign. This permits 
no equal or parem Majestatem to exist. Here we arrive again at the concern of a government within 
a government: 'En in yeders mont bestorven is, datter geen Staet in Staet, Regeeringe in Regeeringe 
kan bestaen.' He states it is evident, however, that the Company is subject to the authority of the 
High Government of the Land, as is any inhabitant of the Netherlands.
201
 
 Turning to Article 2 of the Charter, which as discussed above contains the powers of the WIC 
to conclude treaties, build fortresses and maintain an army, the author recognizes that these kind of 
powers presuppose sovereignty. Hugo Grotius and Gentili also suggested that these were 
'kenteyckenen van hoogheyt en souveraniteyt'. However, as these powers are concessions from the 
lawful sovereign, the States-General, they have to be considered to be exercised in the name of the 
sovereign, not in the name of the Company. The sovereign, to which all commanding officers of the 
Company have to swear an oath of loyalty, as decreed by Article 3 of the Charter. Even the  matters 
of war and peace, laid down in Article 19, do not fall solely within the competence of the Company. 
Decisions that fall within this realm have to be put before the States-General for approval.
202
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In short, the WIC exercises a limited number of public powers and when it does so, these are 
exercised as an agent of the States-General. This competence does not create a sovereign entity 
within or parallel to the state. The WIC remains subordinate to the States-General, as is any 
individual subject of the state. So while both his lawyer and the proponents of Coymans' indictment 
for crimen laesae majestatis agree that the WIC is not in itself a sovereign body, but rather an agent 
of the state, they disagree on the implications of this legal classification. 
 Now the author turns to the question whether any crime was committed at all, in sending 
those letters to Guinea. As discussed above, the contents of the letters were aimed to warn Joost 
Cramer about an impending attack by the WIC on Cabo Corso. Can the supposedly secret schemes 
made by the Directors be considered state secrets? No, he argues, because often enough the WIC 
acts in opposition of the interests of the state, in casu by planning an attack on the subjects of a 
friendly kingdom. In his view, competitors of the Company cannot automatically be equated to 
enemies of the state. Moreover, Coymans does not incite Cramer to commit any illegal acts against 
the WIC. Surely, it is Grotius himself who states in his De Iure Belli ac Pacis that an unprovoked attack 
provides a just cause to strike back.
203
  
 Concluding his argument, Coymans' representative states that the mere fact that the 
consulted jurists are not in agreement on the matter at hand, creates a heavy duty for the prosecutor 
to prove the criminality of the acts committed. Coymans had no criminal intent in writing those 
letters to Cramer, a friend who he wanted to warn about the plans of the Directors to launch an 
illegal attack on the fort Cabo Cors. Even if the articles of the Charter have been broken (which, as he 
has argued is not the case), this would not constitute a criminal act, just a contravention of the 
founding document of a trading company.
204
 As has been laid out at the beginning of this chapter, 
the pleading turned out to be in vain, as Coymans was convicted of treason on 25 January 1662. 
 Surprisingly, Gerard van Tets was released from custody by the court in January 1662. He had 
initially been arrested on similar grounds, namely trying to warn Jan Claessen that the Company had 
put a price on his head. Van Tets'  confession revealed than Claessen had once saved his life and he 
felt that he was obligated to return the favour. He was let off with a mere warning. The decision goes 
against the view put forward in the consultations by van der Elst, Fagel and van Strijen, who were all 
of the opinion that van Tets deserved the same punishment as Coymans. From this selectivity we 
might deduce that the court was not necessarily trying to round up all the participants of the Danish 
African Company. Mostly it was looking to use Coymans as a scapegoat and to make an example of 
him to satisfy the WIC Directors.
205
 This probably happened under influence of Nicolaas Pancras, who 
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was Schepen in Amsterdam and an influential member of the city's ruling elite. He had been one of 
the original participants in the DAC together with Coymans and must have been trying to contain any 
further investigations in the matter out of self-interest.
206
  
 
Treason charges 
In the consults, Isaac Coymans is alternately stated to be charged with the crime of crimen laesae 
majestatis, or crimen perduellionis. Both terms indicate a form of treason, yet perduellio denotes a 
narrower concept of treason than crimen majestatis. The latter was a concept that covered any 'act 
or plot the goal of which was to diminish the greatness or security of the sovereign power'.
207
 
The decision to prosecute Coymans on the basis of these charges already demonstrates in a way the 
politicized nature of the trial. The crime of crimen laesae majestatis or treason has historically been 
used mainly to assert authority and jurisdiction. In his study on the law of treason in Late Medieval 
France, Cuttler states: 
 
'The relationship of law and politics is evinced in one respect by the administration of justice: political 
authority derives from the maintenance of both public and private rights; and the exercise of 
jurisdiction is an exercise in power. In a society in which a single authority exists, the competence of 
a tribunal is a strictly legal matter; but in a society of conflicting authorities jurisdictional entitlement 
becomes more of a political issue than a legal one. [...] 
Because of the vague nature of treason, the decision to prosecute a particular person at a particular 
time could be a political one. The prosecution itself, in which there could be a great deal of flexibility 
in matters of jurisdiction, procedure and punishment, could also be determined by political 
considerations.'
208
 
 
It is not hard to see how Cuttler's characterization of treason trials is applicable to the present case 
of Isaac Coymans and it leads us directly to the central issue in this case: Does a violation of the WIC 
Charter constitute crimen laesae majestatis, or is it merely a violation of the privileges of a private 
corporation? Although historically limited to crimes against the crown, the scope of treason was 
expanded to include crimes against the state itself.
209
 By appealing to the supreme authority of the 
state, European monarchs or, in the case of the Republic, the States-General, tried to avoid inquiry 
into the exact legal relationship between the government and the colonial administrators, which 
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mostly consisted of pragmatic ad hoc solutions.
210
 Ironically, the Coymans trial proved to be a good 
platform to air these questions, evinced by the distribution of the pamphlet containing legal opinions 
on the case.  
 
Provincial Court of Holland, Zeeland and West Friesland 
The proceedings of the case do not only shed a light upon the relation between the WIC and the 
States-General. They were also the stage of a power struggle between the municipal courts, in this 
case the Schepenen Court of Amsterdam, and the Provincial Court of Holland, Zeeland and West 
Friesland. The municipal courts were continuously trying to expand their jurisdiction at the expense 
of the Provincial Court. The powerful cities of Holland possessed voting rights in the State assembly  
and enjoyed a high degree of autonomy.
211
 
 The notoriety of the Coymans trial led to an attempt by the Prosecutor General to appeal the 
case at the Provincial Court. Taking into account the relatively light punishment he was given, it is not 
surprising that the Provincial Court of Holland decided to intervene in the case, resulting in a 
correspondence between the counsellors of the Provincial Court and the Schepenen of Amsterdam. 
In this case, the involvement of judge Pancras with the Danish African Company, and the preference 
held by Amsterdam merchants to lift the monopoly for West Africa probably worked in the 
defendants favour. The Company Directors of the Chamber Amsterdam had been opponents of the 
monopoly of trade given to the West India Company on the coast of West-Africa by force of the 
Charter. They actually preferred to allow private trading in exchange for recognition fees but were 
unsuccessful in convincing the States-General of these convictions.
 212
  The procedural dispute that 
ensued between the Provincial Court and the Amsterdam court concerned the question whether 
appeal was possible in an extraordinary trial. The judges from Amsterdam won the argument by 
referring to a resolution from 1591, that prohibited such an action in extraordinary trials. However, 
as Kernkamp notes, the fear of preferential treatment was not ungrounded as Coymans would be 
released from his prison after sitting out a few years and he was finally set free in February 1667 by 
the States of Holland.
213
 
 The verdict also gave rise to reactions by disgruntled citizens agitating against the nepotism 
of the Amsterdam elite. A pamphlet titled 't Samenspraek tusschen een Hollantsch en Brabantsch 
Koopman, ontrent de negotie van desen tijdt, printed in 1662 in Dordrecht articulates these protests 
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in a conversation between a Brabander and a Hollander. Complaining that Coymans had deserved a 
death sentence and that this case sets a wrong precedent, the Brabander states: 
 
'Gracelick, in ons Lant worden Lant, Stadt, ofte verraders van Forten, soo indigne ge-estimeert, dat 
men die onweerdich ordeelt de straten te betreden, en worden op een horde naer de Galge gesleept 
[...] 
Wat seght gy, dat is doch wat gracelick, onse gansche Brabant sal der over verwondert sijn, 't gelt, 't 
gelt kan machtich veel te wege brengen, dat d'eene aen de koorde kan knoopen, kan d'ander door 
gelt doen af-koopen, de kleyne Diefjens hanght men, de groote laet men loopen: doch echter sijn 
credit ende reputatie moeter nu gansch toe liggen, want wie eenen quaden naem heeft, is half 
gehangen. Een Schip op zant, seght men is een baken in Zee, dit exempel sal andere ten goede 
dienen, hy spiegelt hem sacht, die hem aen andere spiegelt.'
214
 
 
Concluding, the trial exposed a lot of dissension within the Republic: scholarly concerns about the 
legal dimension of the WIC were expressed. It also reveals that the outcome of these discussions 
were in reality very much dependent on the realities of power and balancing the commercial and 
governmental concerns. In her article The Long Goodbye, Martine van Ittersum notes that the view 
held by the High Court of Holland on matters of overseas expansion has not yet been thoroughly 
researched in Dutch historiography. Although in the Coymans case it concerns the Provincial Court, 
we can surmise that at least this court of appeal supports the view of the WIC as a direct agent of the 
States-General. Their concern with this case indicates the mistrust against the municipal court of 
Amsterdam, which they suspect of being prejudiced in a case concerning one of their own.
215
 
 In her account on the role of sovereignty in empire, Benton shortly sums up the 
consequences of jurisdictional politics within empires. Her analysis corresponds with the findings of 
the cases discussed in this thesis: 
 
'Disputes invoking claims and accusations about loyalty, maladministration of justice, and the 
delegation or usurpation of legal authority in imperial settings can be read as discourses about 
sovereignty, but of course for imperial actors the stakes were also both higher and lower, because 
conflicts focused on particular interests and goals of discrete groups; higher because outcomes could 
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mean catastrophic loss - of life, patronage, property, commercial rights, and political influence - and 
irreparable damage to the viability of empire itself.'
216
 
 
It is not hard to recognize in these findings the tribulations of the merchant Isaac Coymans and of 
captain Croeger and his crew. The outcomes of the disputes under review mattered greatly for the 
involved parties (Coymans, Pancras, Croeger) and the interests they represented; at the same time, 
at a higher level, the different takes on the legal concepts of jurisdiction and sovereignty that came 
to be discussed in the course of these kinds of disputes were determinative for the shape of Dutch 
commercial empire. 
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V Dispute with the Danish Crown  
 
The disturbance in the usually friendly relations with Denmark and Sweden caused by the Coymans 
trial, touches upon an important observation: divergence between Company policy and state foreign 
policy is another issue where Company sovereignty is put to the test. Is the Republic responsible for 
any wrongful acts committed by the WIC against other states? And to what extent did the granted 
powers of the Dutch West India Company grow out of fear of foreign competitors? In order to 
maintain the competitive edge it was of paramount importance for the WIC to defend its trading 
monopoly. Moreover, one of the main reasons for the States-General to grant the monopoly in the 
first place was as a compensation for the Company's function as an instrument of war. 
 In February 1661, a Company ship had captured a galleon, equipped by the Danish African 
Company, named the Postillon van Venetië, around Castle Mina on the coast of Guinea. The ship was 
carrying a number of documents and letters, including the letters written by Isaac Coymans to Joost 
Cramer.
217
 Yet the capture of the Postillon was only one of many injuries inflicted back and forth 
between the two parties. Another cause was, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the conflict that 
had started when Samuel Smidt had transferred some trading posts on the Gold Coast to the WIC, 
ordered by Caerloff.  
 
International State Responsibility for acts committed by the West-India Company? 
The legal issue that arose from the conflict between the West-India Company and the Danish African 
Company concerns the question of international state responsibility: Was the Dutch Republic 
responsible for actions committed by the WIC against neutral power Denmark? Responsibility can 
only be established if the WIC is actually an organ of the state. Verzijl has concluded that 
responsibility can be attributed to a State 'for all acts committed by its officials or organs'.
218
 
Moreover, Lindley argues that: 'When a State has called such a body into being for express purposes, 
it should, it would seem, be prepared to accept international responsibility for the way in which 
those purposes are carried out, so long as the Corporation is working under its Charter.'
219
 
The dispute also serves as an example of the workings of early modern territorial claims and the 
importance of its foundations in law. As Benton and Straumann have shown, these claims do not 
revolve about an absolute show of title to territory. It is a question of relativity. Which European 
                                                           
217
 Verklaring Charisius 12-11-1661, NaA, SG, inv. nr. 4846. 
218
 Roelofsen, Cornelis G., 'The Claim of some Citizens of Stettin against the Dutch Republic and its Adjudication 
(1609-17). State Responsibility in Early Modern Europe; Apropos of De Iure Belli ac Pacis II.17.20' in: Terry D. 
Gill and Wybo P. Heere, Reflections on Principles and Practice of International Law. Essays in Honour of Leo J. 
Bouchez (The Hague 2000) 175-189, aldaar: 177. 
219
 M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law. Being a treatise on 
the law and practice relating to colonial expansion (London 1926) 91. 
53 
 
power has a stronger claim than the other in these inter-imperial disputes? Creatively using concepts 
drawn from Roman property law, scholars tried to come up with legitimizations of acquiring overseas 
territories.
220
 In contemporary international law this relativity aspect is still in relevant. In contrast to 
most domestic systems of law, where there are formal requirements to be met that would lead to an 
absolute title, international courts or arbitrators in boundary conflicts will assign territory to the state 
party that makes the best case.
221
 
 Both the representative of the Danish Crown and the WIC tried to convince the States-
General of the harm done by the other party and the righteousness of their own positions.  
The battle was not only fought in The Hague however. The arguments raised by both sides were 
published in pamphlets and thus became part of a publicity war as well. The Dutch financiers behind 
the DAC cleverly succeeded in causing a diplomatic conflict by appealing to the Danish Crown. 
The stories of the men involved in the Danish Africa Company reveal the opportunities that overseas 
trade offered to those early modern Europeans with adventurous spirits. Men like Hendrick Caerloff 
easily switched allegiance if it served their individual purposes and interests. Legal concepts like 
sovereignty, subjecthood and the 'state' were not yet developed enough to directly deal with these 
entrepreneurs, who were either not at all concerned with the law, or were just adept at finding those 
legally grey areas to maneuver in.  
 On November 12, 1661 Petrus Charisius, representative of the Danish crown in The Hague, 
appeared before a meeting of the States-General  after a visit to Copenhagen. He presented the 
claim of the Danish Crown, being that they demanded satisfaction for the harm done to Danish ships 
ordered by Director General on the Guinea coast, Director-General Jasper van Heussen. Moreover, in 
order to preserve the friendly relations between the Republic and Denmark, the States-General 
would have to impose sanctions on the Dutch West India Company.
222 
 These would include the 
restitution of a trading post taken by the WIC and guarantees that similar situations would be 
prevented in the future. The WIC Directors would have to make sure that the Danish ship Frederick, 
which was on its way to the African coast, would be allowed safe passage on arrival. Charisius 
warned the delegates of the harmful consequences that could follow "per fas et nefas" if the 
Directors of the WIC kept stalling and refusing to compensate for the damages incurred.
223
  Rejecting 
jurisdiction of a Dutch court in resolving the conflict, the Danes considered themselves to be forced 
to  resort to taking countermeasures: a Dutch ship named Graeff Enno which had entered Plymouth 
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was arrested in 1661 by English authorities on the request of the Danish emissary in London.
224
 In the 
mean time, after examination by a commission of the States-General, the WIC Directors of the 
Chamber of Amsterdam were ordered to start preparing a legal defence for the actions of Van 
Heussen in anticipation of a court case. Moreover, they had written a request, appealing to the 
English authorities to release the Graeff Enno. The request was granted, to no  avail however, as the 
English took it as security for their own pending claims against the WIC.
225
 This exemplifies how the 
European powers were involved in a continuous struggle over their positions on the Guinea coast. 
Joost Cramer had also proceeded to capture two Dutch vessels loaded with gold, slaves and ivory. 
These actions urged the States-General to condemn the Danish Company for violating the law of 
nations and for letting Dutch citizens (obviously referring to Coymans, Caerloff and their 
accomplices) circumvent the WIC Charter under the Danish flag.
226
 Thereafter, in February 1663, king 
of Denmark sent a proposal to the States-General to attempt judicial settlement of the growing 
conflict between the WIC and Danish African Company on the Guinea coast. The proposal was aimed 
at establishing an ad hoc college, composed of independent judges, to arbitrate the case.
227
 It 
appears that the States-General was not yet ready to accept such a proposal. 
 In June 1664, Michiel ten Hove, lawyer for the WIC, sent a memorial to the States-General 
reaffirming their rights to the territories in West Africa. Ten Hove enumerates the historical claims of 
the WIC on several forts and trading posts in the region. Subsequently he contests that the places 
and forts captured by Hendrick Caerloff belong to the Danish Crown, as his expedition was financed 
by Caerloff himself and thus became his personal property. By transferring Cabo Corso to the WIC in 
1659, the WIC had become the rightful owner. A transfer that could not be prejudiced by a later 
contract between Caerloff and the Danish Company concerning the sale of the fort.
 
Any claims made 
by the Danish Crown had to be addressed at Caerloff, he argued, there is no legal grounds for action 
against the WIC. Moreover, ten Hove states, Article 1 of the capitulation granted by the Danish 
Crown to Caerloff, declares that any property captured by Caerloff can be transferred to allies of the 
Crown unconditionally, in this case to the Republic.
228
 As evidence of the prohibition to trade within 
each other's territories without permission of the other state, ten Hove cites centuries old state 
practice between the European powers,  affirmed by many treaties concluded to that end between 
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the respective states. The Portuguese, who held the disputed territories between 1482 and 1637 had 
always excluded participation by foreign merchants. Therefore, the Dutch, as legal successors to the 
Portuguese, are allowed to maintain the same policy.
229
 After further elaborating on how Caerloff 
had set out to pit the Danes against the WIC, ten Hove claims that Charisius was actually acting in 
bad faith by submitting his memorial, because Caerloff had testified that he had told Charisius about 
his plans to swindle the WIC.
230
  
 Specifically concerning the confiscation of the Postillon van Venetien, the Danish 
representative had apparently accused the WIC of having acted as a judge in its own case, a critique 
that remind us of the issue central to the Alckmaer case, as seen in Chapter III. In reply, ten Hove 
states that the judicial officials in charge of the process had taken their oath of loyalty to the States-
General, and cannot be supposed to have acted on behalf of the Company, even if they were in the 
service of the Company: 
 
'Ende dewelcke haer Eedt ghedaen hebbende niet en moeten werden ghepresumeert, uyt insicht van 
de Compagnie een ander ongelijck gedaen te hebben, Min ofte meer als de Hoven van Justitie hier te 
Lande, de Collegien der Admiraliteyten ende andere die door de respective Overheden sijnde gestelt 
op aenklachte van de Fiscalen recht ende justitie administreeren.'
231
 
 
In a response to the Remonstrantie delivered by the WIC to the States-General in 1664, the directors 
of the Danish Africa Company decided to turn to their sovereign, King Frederick III of Denmark. 
Assuring that the arrest of the Graeff Enno in England was justified, they urged the Crown to set up 
an arbitral Commission made up of judges from both sides to bring an end to the ongoing conflict.
232
 
 The author of the Danish brief goes on to reject the two main arguments on which the WIC 
based its exclusive trading rights and jurisdiction over the territories on the Guinea coast. The WIC 
lawyers claim that: first, the Dutch have rightfully occupied those territories jure belli. In the war 
against the Spanish and Portuguese, Castle Elmina and other fortresses have been captured, thereby 
transferring their possession on the Dutch. Second, the WIC advocate argued that local rulers have 
concluded treaties with the WIC submitting themselves to Company jurisdiction, which had resulted 
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in the right for the Dutch to exclude other Europeans from trading on the African coast.
233
 Evidently 
this argument used by the WIC advocates, adopts Grotius' contract theory presented in Mare 
Liberum. Exclusion of other states from trading in certain areas (which would be a natural right for 
all) can be justified through the conclusion of contracts with local rulers. In this case, the contractual 
obligations of both parties (pacta sunt servanda) supersede the natural right to freedom of access 
and trade.
234
 Concerning the first point it is stated that: 
 
'In d'Remonstrantie poogt d'Westind: Comp: bykans booven haar kraght, immers tegens alle recht en 
reeden staande te houden, dat over alle d'Landen van Guinea aan haar, niet alleen Jurisdictie; maar 
oock d'Jura Majestatis syn competerende. Formerende daarop d'soete hoewel valsche conclusie, alle 
andere Natien sonder exeptie, van daar te excludeeren, en in Utopiam te relegeren.'
235
 
 
The WIC cannot claim to have sovereign power on the coast of Africa, so it cannot justify excluding 
other nations from trading there. Although the Danish lawyer does not refute the possibility to 
legally acquire possession under the laws of war, he claims that as the Portuguese, arriving in 1481, 
did not have full sovereignty but rather imperium mixtum over the coastal areas, the Dutch cannot in 
any way claim to have taken over full sovereignty: quod nemo plus juris ab alio accipere possit, quam 
id habuit. One cannot acquire a more extensive right from someone, than that which he possesses. 
Falling back on the original arrival of the Portuguese fleet, under command of Diego Dezabuija, the 
author states that the Portuguese had never claimed any superiority or jurisdiction over the 
inhabitants of the Guinea coast.
 
Any Portuguese exclusion of other nations only reflected the de 
facto situation and was not based on any legal right.
 236
 The principle invoked here against Dutch 
claims is one that is still valid in current international law with regards to cession of territory between 
two states. It was affirmed in the Island of Las Palmas arbitration mentioned in the Introduction. The 
arbitrators held that Spain, in an 1898 treaty with the U.S. could not cede more rights to the other 
party than it possessed, so the U.S. were unable to claim to have acquired sovereignty over the island 
based on this agreement.
237
 
 On the second point, the author argues that the mere fact that the Dutch had to resort to the 
conclusion of treaties with the African kingdoms points to the fact that WIC presence on the coast 
was merely tolerated. He points out that there is an internal contradiction in the WIC's arguments 
because they first claim to have actual possession, and as a subsidiary argument state to have 
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concluded exclusionary contracts. Why would there be a need to make agreements with local rulers 
if the Company is in possession of these territories?  
 Moreover, the existence of commercial treaties with the Dutch would not preclude the 
African sovereigns to conclude treaties with other European powers. This Grotian theory is outright 
rejected by the DAC advocate:
238
 
 
'En connen niet sowel d'opgerichte Contracten, als d'heele Fetusche Regeringe genoegsaam doen 
blycken, dat d'Coninck Heer en Meester in syn landt is? 
 En heeft niet de Coninck van Acraa, synde Souverain Regent, soo wel macht, met d'Coninckl: 
Deensche, als met d'Westind: Comp: te contraheeren, en in syn Coninckryck Privilegie en vryheydt te 
geven; gelyck met den Bergh Congo geschiet t 'syn, alreede verhaalt is?'
239
 
  
 In colourful wording, the WIC is likened to the Lernaean Hydra, the mythical many-headed 
monster that grows a new head each time one is chopped off. Each argument that is contradicted, 
leads the WIC lawyers to come up with another one: referring to the aforementioned sale of forts 
and trading posts by Hendrick Caerloff to the WIC in 1659. The directors of the Danish African 
Company reject the truthfulness of this story, and point to a contract  dated March 28, 1659 between 
Hendrick Caerloff and Danish Admiralty Councillor Paul Klingenberg transferring the forts at Cabo 
Corso, Taccaran and Anamabo and the lodge at Orsu to the Crown of Denmark.
240
 Moreover, on 22 
July 1660, Caerloff had apparently testified to the Dutch Ambassador to this end: 
 
'Nu is sulcks, dat ick naar het inneemen, niet alleen alle vlyt hebbe aangewende, om deselve 
plaatsen, voor hoogst-gedachte Majesteyt te conserveren, toe dien eynde by de geallieerde, des 
nodigh synde, wel assisentie is versocht, maar noyt het minste deel, dieswegen gecontracteert; veel 
min getransporteert. [...] [G]een de minste intentie is geweest, door het inneemen der Comp: 
Volckeren, die plaatsen van syn Coninckl: Mayest:  te ontvreemden, maar dat oock dieswegen geen 
transport, ofte eenige acte mede is gemaackt; invoegen uyt neffensgaande Notariale Attestatie, 
breeder blyckt.'
241
 
 
In their view the original Danish capitulation granted to Caerloff had merely stated that he was 
allowed to seek assistance from allied nations (i.e. the Republic) in case of an attack by England or 
Sweden. Thus the Dutch have a false understanding of the meaning of this capitulation. 
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 How does the dispute between the WIC and the DAC reflect on the relationship between the 
WIC and the States-General? The States-General and the Directors of the WIC had issued 
contradicting instructions to the Director-General concerning the treatment of the Danish traders on 
the Guinea coast. One the one hand, in a resolution dated 16 November 1661, the States-General 
had ordered Director-General Jasper van Heussen to maintain friendly relations with the allied 
Danish nation.
242
 On the other hand, the Company Directors ordered him to try to interfere as much 
as possible in the Danish trading activities, assuring him that any responsibility for damages would 
eventually be carried by the Company. 
243
 The Company, concerned about its diminishing profits 
disregarded the interests of the state to maintain good relations with a ally. The DAC saw itself faced 
with the difficult situation that it would not be able to get a fair judgment in Dutch courts, while the 
States-General could (or would?) not force the WIC Directors to pay any damages: 
 
'Naardemaal de Deensche Compagnie sigh noyt voor de Ho: Mo: Heeren Staaten Generaal, ofte voor 
de Ed: GrootMogende Heeren Staaten van Hollandt en West-Vrieslandt, in proces ingelaaten, haare 
vierschaar gekendt, veel min haar oordeel onderworpen heeft. De West-Indische Compagnie (dewijl 
sij van haar Overicheyt niet en is gedwongen satisfactie te doen) sigh bij deese rooverij seer wel 
bevindende; Slaat haare Wolfs-claauwen wijder op vrije Zee [...]'
244
 
 
Eventually both parties would be forced to resolve their issues, pressured by the outbreak of the 
Second Anglo-Dutch War in 1665. The States-General and the King of Denmark were to conclude an 
agreement, mediated by the King of France. The outbreak of the war was itself partly the result of 
strife over the Coast of West-Africa, as the English Royal Africa Company was looking to end Dutch 
domination in the region and to oust them from their trading posts and forts.
245
 So, the escalating 
series of events between the WIC and DAC finally led to the conclusion of a treaty, stipulating that 
arbitration was necessary between the two companies in order to settle claims of damages on both 
sides (although the Company Directors still tried to move the States-General to appoint Dutch 
arbitrators). On 11 February 1666 a treaty of alliance was signed between the States-General and the 
Danish Crown.
246
 A separate agreement was concluded on the same day, concerning the conflict 
between the WIC and the Danish Africa Company. It called for the cessation of all hostilities between 
the two companies on the Guinea coast. The Danish Company would drop its claims on the outposts 
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of Cabo Corso, Tacquorari and Annemabo. Moreover, after the expiration of the Danish charter in 
1679, the forts of Fredericksborg and Orsu would be ceded to the WIC. Lastly, it states that the 
Danish authorities must enact regulations in order to prevent any person residing on Dutch territory, 
like Isaac Coymans,  participating in the Danish African Company. Otherwise their invested capital 
will be subject to confiscation. Article 6 of the agreement covers the past claims between the two 
companies and stipulates that they should be resolved through arbitration. 
247
 Clearly the Danish 
negotiators had to yield to the Dutch, faced with the war against England, precluding further judicial 
settlement of the conflict, except in the matter of the arrested ships. 
 In the arbitration agreement both parties agreed to submit a list of their charges against each 
other within two months after signing the document and to abide by the verdict that would follow. 
The execution of the verdict would require both the Danish Crown and the States-General to force 
the respective Companies to compensate for the damages incurred by the other party.
248
 Both states 
in this case seem to be prepared to accept responsibility for the wrongful acts committed by 'their' 
trading companies, if found guilty that is. The WIC would then be seen as an agent of the state 
carrying public authority, the acts of which have to be equated with acts by the state itself. Even 
though the Company apparently went against the policy dictated by the States-General. 
  In this respect it differs from the individual privateer that was the subject of the case of the 
merchants of Stettin. A case that concerned a privateer named Dirck Dircksz. who had captured a 
vessel (the Salvator) in 1606, belonging to merchants from the town of Stettin in Pomerania. The 
captain had been granted a privateering commission by the States-General, however, apparently 
Dircksz. was not planning on returning to the Netherlands with his cargo, thereby disregarding the 
conditions of his commission. On behalf of the merchants, the Duke of Pomerania sent a letter to the 
States-General demanding compensation. After more correspondence and threats of reprisal by the 
Duke, the case ended up in a Dutch court in 1610. Advocate Fiscal Hendrik Storm of the Amsterdam 
Admiralty Court argues in this case that a state cannot be held responsible for the actions committed 
by subjects acting in a private capacity (because the commission had been violated).
249
 With some 
caution, a parallel might be drawn with current developments in which non-state actors like 
multinationals increasingly take over activities formerly reserved for states, like the employment of 
private military companies. The Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, drafted by the International Law Commission state in article 5 that: 'The conduct of a 
person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which is empowered by the 
law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of 
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the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the 
particular instance.'
250
    
 Of course it has to be noted that the agreement to subject the case to arbitration by the king 
of France was a decision of political expediency. In the face of a naval war with England, an alliance 
with Denmark  was necessary to keep access to the Baltic Sea open. The arbitration was put into a 
separate annex to the 1666 Treaty of Alliance, to resolve the issues that had risen over the African 
trade, yet it can be doubted that any solution involving judicial settlement would have followed in 
other circumstances. As Roelofsen states in his article about the Stettin case, accepting state 
responsibility by the States-General could set a dangerous precedent, especially in the case of the 
WIC, since the Company was actively involved in the business of privateering.
251
 As laid out above 
there also exists a tension between the concerns of the States-General to maintain friendly relations 
with its Scandinavian allies  and the commercial interests of the WIC and its efforts to exclude others 
from trading within the Limits of its Charter. Here we are again reminded of Spruyt's argument about 
the inefficiency of divided sovereignty in international relations. However, the constitutional 
arrangement of a state using a private entity to represent its overseas interests worked well for the 
seventeenth century Netherlands. With regards to the matter of state responsibility, the use of 
divisible sovereignty could provide what Adams calls 'interposed layers of plausible deniability'. The 
States-General could effectively deny to have any control over, or even knowledge of, what the WIC 
was doing in their dispute with the DAC.
 
Except in this case, which for political reasons ended up in 
arbitral settlement between two states.
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Conclusion 
 
Rather than trying to find out whether the WIC should be considered to be a sovereign entity under 
international law - a question that (for the VOC) has already been answered by Somers - the goal of 
this thesis was to look at the internal relationship between the state and the company. The main 
question raised in the Introduction read: to what extent was the WIC able to operate as a de facto 
state overseas? 
 Previous research on the nature of imperial sovereignty has shown that sovereignty in this 
period was a matter of delegation and divisibility. The WIC carried a bundle of rights that would 
today be part of the broader concept of territorial sovereignty. The matter of sovereignty and 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Dutch chartered companies is not a matter of anachronistically 
applying our current day conceptions of these legal principles to early modern reality. The dividing 
line between public and private was not easily discernible because the early modern state in Europe 
was not capable of performing all those functions that we would today described as the 'core 
functions' of the state. In the seventeenth century Netherlands, this led to the necessity of privatizing 
some of those functions. Moreover, the wealthy, decentralized Republic provided a good 
environment for commercial elites to obtain political clout, further entangling private and public 
interests.  
 The legal dimensions of the Dutch companies were discussed by two prominent Dutch 
scholars. Pieter de la Court is wary of the extensive powers granted to the VOC and WIC and warns 
against the dangers of a state operating within a state. Whereas Hugo Grotius, according to recent 
interpretations of his work, was very much trying to create a legal justification for Dutch overseas 
expansion using private corporations, favoring the idea of divisible sovereignty, freedom of 
navigation and trade, private warfare and the inviolability of international agreements. 
 Not surprisingly, the Dutch approach led to numerous legal disputes, of which I have 
discussed three in the current thesis. A number of conclusions can be drawn after the reading of 
these cases. The case of the seizure of the Alckmaer concerns the judicial jurisdiction of the WIC and 
reveals how the lack of a clear constitutional structure in the relation between the company and the 
state leads to conflict. By letting the company be judge in its own cause, commercial interests 
prevailed over fundamental principles of justice. Eventually the States-General decides to intervene, 
which is not so much a sign of governmental concern with justice; rather it meant that the owners of 
the ship were probably aligned with the right families back in the Republic. 
 The notorious treason trial of Isaac Coymans indirectly concerns the question of the whether 
the WIC should be considered as a part of the state. As Coymans is convicted by the Amsterdam 
court, the judges evidently decide that it is, however, the politicized nature of the trial does not 
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suggest the decision was based on a purely legal motivation. The opinions contained in the discussed 
pamphlet give an insight in the various arguments that are employed and show that this question 
was an actual topic of concern. The contribution written by Willem de Groot and others, seem to 
echo the ideas of his brother Hugo as posited in (the still undiscovered) De Iure Praedae and Mare 
Liberum. One recurring fear voiced by some of the jurists discussed, is that of the company acting as 
a government within a government, the fear of imperium in imperio. Coymans' low sentencing can 
again be considered as an example of how these disputes are mostly decided by the dominant 
interests within the regenten class, in this case through interference of Pancras as member of a 
group of wealthy Amsterdam merchants.  
 The uncertainty about the WIC's legal position created conflict internally within the Republic, 
but also with other European states, even with allies. From the exchange of legal arguments 
presented in chapter V, it appears that both companies (the DAC and WIC) are acting as full subjects 
of international law, carrying rights and obligations (and being allowed to enforce those rights); 
capable of concluding treaties, possessing territories and exercising jurisdiction on their own accord. 
Only when the conflict is escalates, the companies turn to their sovereign overlords. However, when 
it comes to the issue of state responsibility for wrongful acts, the States-General is obviously trying to 
deny any liability. They hold off requests by the Danish crown to recompense the DAC for attacks by 
the WIC, until the outbreak of the war with England forces them to a settlement.  
 The WIC functioned as a kind of para-government for Atlantic affairs, whose interests were 
not always in line with those of the States-General. This constitutional arrangement functioned well 
for the most part when there was alignment between commercial and political interests. Stern and 
Wilson have used the term corporate sovereignty, to describe the de facto situation of respectively 
the English East India Company and the VOC acting as states in their overseas territories. As the 
public powers of the company were based on a charter granted by the state, the WIC cannot be 
equated with a sovereign nation-state as we know it today. However, considering the practice of the 
fragmented Dutch state and the theory of divisible sovereignty, I would argue that the concept of 
corporate sovereignty can also be applied to the WIC. In practice, the deliberately unclear 
constitutional structure provided a useful flexibility with regards to other European powers, but a 
lack of legal certainty for citizens trying to participate in overseas trade. For the more wealthy and 
fortunate citizens however, this uncertainty was compensated through the prevalent practices of 
patronage and clientelism. Moreover, this environment provided a wealth of opportunity for lawyers 
to try and substantiate claims of their clients and make the legal theory fit the complicated reality of 
the Atlantic trade. 
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